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A PROPOSAL TO REFINE THE SUITABILITY STANDARD 
BY QUANTIFYING RECOMMENDATION RISK AND 
CLIENT APPROPRIATE RISK LEVELS 
Unsuitable recommendation of securities is one of the most common 
and costly claims in the brokerage industry.1  
Perhaps the clearest example of a suitability violation occurs where a 
broker recommends speculative securities to a customer whose financial 
situation clearly calls for conservative investments (for example, a retired 
person who needs the income from his investments for his living expenses 
and who has no reasonable expectation of being able to replace any 
substantial trading losses).2 
The current standard for determining “unsuitability” is subjective: Whether 
the broker reasonably believed his recommendation to be suitable for his 
client when he made it. The enormous quantity of claims3 suggests that 
such a subjective standard may not be satisfactory and that refinement of 
the applicable laws and rules may be necessary. Without a clear standard, 
brokers may not know whether their recommendations are suitable. 
Similarly, attorneys for claimants and respondents have difficulty assessing 
their own cases. An objective standard based on financial data currently 
available to brokers is a better solution and would better guide brokers in 
making recommendations to their clients. Such a standard would improve 
the ability of lawyers to assess their clients’ cases, thus reducing the 
quantity of claims filed by investors and increasing the amount of 
settlements when claims were filed. 
Unsuitable recommendations are proscribed by securities industry self-
regulatory organization4 (SRO) rules which require that a broker “have 
reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation [of a security] is 
suitable for such customer.”5 The Second Circuit requires five elements to 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg, Suitability in Securities Transactions, 54 BUS. 
LAW. 1557, 1557 (1999). 
In an Avoidance and Prevention Advisory (Advisory) distributed to its member firms 
in May 1998, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) disclosed 
that unsuitability claims account for ninety-five percent of filings under NASD 
members’ errors and omissions insurance policies. “Because they are the most 
common yet most ambiguous of all client accusations,” the Advisory said, 
“‘unsuitability’ claims can often create significant problems for your firm. This is 
because what constitutes a viable unsuitability claim is open to debate.” 
Id. 
 2. NORMAN POSER, BROKER DEALER REGULATION § 3.03 (3d ed. 2005). 
 3. NASD.com, NASD Dispute Resolution Statistics, Summary Arbitration Statistics  
October 2006, http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&nodeId=516&ss 
SourceNodeId=12. 
 4. The Securities and Exchange Commission sanctioned and approved the self-regulatory 
organizations including the National Association of Securities Dealers and the New York Stock 
Exchange to propose, implement, and enforce rules of conduct for the securities industry. 
 5. NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2310; NYSE RULES R. 405. 
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prove a claim of unsuitability under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (the ‘34 Act) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.6 Federal 
courts have required scienter in the recommendation of an unsuitable 
security, and that damages resulted from the investor’s justifiable reliance 
on that recommendation.7 
The current standard for proving unsuitability, under federal law and 
SRO Rules, requires proof that the broker lacked a reasonable belief that the 
recommended security was suitable for his client.8 This standard is 
unsatisfactory because it is “nebulous and amorphous.”9 This lack of a clear 
standard causes problems of proof for claimants, rebuttal for respondents 
and fails to establish satisfactory prophylactic direction.10 
This article proposes a standard which quantifies the amount of risk 
inherent in a broker’s recommendation and compares that risk to the client’s 
appropriate risk level, and that certain objectively determined levels of risk 
are presumptively suitable or unsuitable for brokers to recommend to 
clients based upon their risk profile. 
Part I of this article discusses the development and current state of 
unsuitability claims under SRO and federal law. Part II suggests that the 
suitability standard should be objective and weigh the level of risk inherent 
in a broker’s recommendation against the client’s appropriate risk level. 
Part III proposes an objective standard for determining suitability: the 
comparison of Risk Quotient (RQ)11 to Client Appropriate Risk Level 
(CARL);12 and discusses brokers’ and investors’ responsibility to explain 
and understand risk; and investors’ acceptance of market risk when they 
invest in securities. 
Part IV of this article proposes that an RQ less than or equal to one (RQ 
≤ 1.0) is presumptively suitable for any investor; that an RQ greater than or 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993); 15 U.S.C. § 
78a, et seq. 
 7. Brown, 991 F.2d at 1031. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1557 (“The suitability doctrine, always somewhat nebulous 
and amorphous with respect to its content and parameters. . . .”). 
 10. Roger W. Reinsch, J. Bradley Reich and Nauzer Balsara, Trust Your Broker?: Suitability, 
Modern Portfolio Theory, And Expert Witnesses, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 173, 173 (Winter, 2004) 
(“The issues in and surrounding suitability claims are complex, yet surprisingly little has been 
written on this topic.”); Stuart D. Root, Suitability—The Sophisticated Investor—and Modern 
Portfolio Management, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 287, 289 (1991) (“The problems of 
‘unsuitability’—what does it mean, how is it measured, who should bear the risk of determining 
suitability—are not new. But these problems will most certainly become more frequent and arcane 
as the architecture of investment securities and strategies becomes more exotic.”). 
11 Risk Quotient (RQ) is a term proposed by the author in this article. It is a measure of the risk of 
a position or portfolio of equity securities where the numerator is the volatility or beta and the 
denominator is the percentage of equity, which recognizes the impact of leverage on risk. 
12 Client Appropriate Risk Level (CARL) is also a term proposed by the author in this article. It 
signifies the objectively determinable amount of risk appropriate for a client despite her subjective 
view or her broker’s opinion. 
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equal to 2.0 (RQ ≥ 2.0) is presumptively unsuitable for any investor; 
discusses the impact of an objective standard for suitability claims; and 
concludes that a clear, well-defined standard is necessary for meaningful 
review of unsuitability awards. This article concludes that a clear, well-
defined standard is necessary to avert a developing crisis where both 
claimants and respondents are bound to arbitrate, but have no meaningful 
review of awards available to them. 
I. SRO AND FEDERAL UNSUITABILITY CLAIMS 
A. SRO RULES PROHIBIT UNSUITABLE RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
MAY RESULT IN DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AND SANCTIONS 
Investors may bring a claim of unsuitability before an arbitration 
panel13 under NASD Rule 231014 or under NYSE Rule 405.15 “Although the 
NYSE does not have a general suitability rule, its ‘know your customer’ 
rule requires NYSE members to use ‘due diligence to learn the essential 
facts relative to every customer [and] every order.’”16 The NASD, on the 
other hand, specifically addresses unsuitable recommendations: 
Recommendations to Customers (Suitability) 
(a) In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any 
security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the 
recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, 
if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other security holdings and as 
to his financial situation and needs. 
(b) Prior to the execution of a transaction recommended to a non-
institutional customer, other than transactions with customers where 
investments are limited to money market mutual funds, a member shall 
make reasonable efforts to obtain information concerning: 
(1) the customer’s financial status; 
(2) the customer’s tax status; 
(3) the customer’s investment objectives; and 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Under NASD Rule 10302, a panel of three arbitrators hears cases that have claims of 
damages in excess of $25,000, while amounts under $25,000 are decided by a single arbitrator on 
the basis of pleadings, and are known as “paper cases.” NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 
10302. 
 14. Id. R.2310. 
 15. NYSE RULES R. 405 (“Rule 405. Diligence as to Accounts. Every member organization is 
required through a general partner, a principal executive officer or a person or persons designated 
under the provisions of Rule 342(b)(1) to (1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative 
to every customer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by such 
organization and every person holding power of attorney over any account accepted or carried by 
such organization. Supervision of Accounts (2) Supervise diligently all accounts handled by 
registered representatives of the organization.”). 
 16. POSER, supra note 3, § 3.03, at 3-89. 
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(4) such other information used or considered to be reasonable by 
such member or registered representative in making recommendations 
to the customer.17 
Additional NASD broker duties are found in the, so called, “Know 
Your Customer Rule” where, “Members’ responsibilities include having a 
reasonable basis for recommending a particular security or strategy. In 
addition, the know-your-customer requirement . . .requires a careful review 
of the appropriateness of transactions in low-priced, speculative securities, 
whether solicited or unsolicited.”18 Thus, a broker is required to learn about 
the investor’s financial condition,19 including the investor’s source of funds 
for the account, the investor’s goals for these funds, and the investor’s 
ability to sustain risk20 before making any recommendation. 
The Second Circuit has found that NASD Rules “prohibit[] the sale to a 
customer by a broker or dealer of unsuitable securities.”21 In furtherance of 
this end, the NASD rules state that, “[i]n recommending to a customer the 
purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member shall have reasonable 
grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer 
upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other 
security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.”22 
Accordingly, to make a suitable recommendation,23 a broker must 
                                                                                                                 
 17. NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2310. 
 18. Members Reminded to Use Best Practices When Dealing in Speculative Securities, 
SPECIAL NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 96-32, May 9, 1996, at 233 (emphasis added); Lowenfels, 
supra note 1, at 1560.  
Four months later, in response to protests from discount brokers, the NASD purported 
to “clarify” the above reference to “unsolicited transactions” by issuing Notice to 
Members 96-60: “A member’s suitability obligation under Rule 2310 applies only to 
securities that have been recommended by the member. It would not apply, therefore, 
to situations in which a member acts solely as an order-taker for persons who, on their 
own initiative, effect transactions without a recommendation from the member.” 
Id. 
 19. NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2310. 
 20. See generally DAVID E. ROBBINS, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL § 5-5 
(5th ed. 2003). 
 21. Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600–601 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 22. See NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2110. The rule also requires members and their 
brokers to “observe high standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles of 
trade.” Id. 
 23. Because what constitutes a recommendation may also be the subject of a claim or defense, 
the NASD issued the following statement: 
[A] broad range of circumstances may cause a transaction to be considered 
recommended, and this determination does not depend on the classification of the 
transaction by a particular member as “solicited” or “unsolicited.” In particular, a 
transaction will be considered to be recommended when the member or its associated 
person brings a specific security to the attention of the customer through any means, 
including, but not limited to, direct telephone communication, the delivery of 
promotional material through the mail, or the transmission of electronic messages. 
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understand the risks inherent in the investment and believe that such risks 
are justified by the potential rewards in light of the investor’s financial 
situation.24 
Arbitration panels often cite the “speculative nature of a stock;”25 when 
determining suitability. In recent years, that an investment was a “tech 
stock” or “technology stock;”26 and most commonly that the investment 
was “high risk,” “risky” or “volatile”27 has been cited. Currently, only two 
available SRO arbitration awards cite considerations of objective statistical 
comparison between recommended securities and the broader markets.28 
The descriptions of the securities at issue in suitability claims are arbitrary, 
and “[n]o securities industry standard of conduct is more frequently cited, 
                                                                                                                 
NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 96-60, Sept. 1996, at 474. 
 24. See Hanly v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969). 
[A Broker] cannot recommend a security unless there is an adequate and reasonable 
basis for such recommendation. He must disclose facts which he knows and those 
which are reasonably ascertainable. By his recommendation he implies that a 
reasonable investigation has been made and that his recommendation rests on the 
conclusions based on such investigation. Where the salesman lacks essential 
information about a security, he should disclose this as well as the risks which arise 
from his lack of information. 
Id. 
 25. On November 14, 2006 the following LexisNexis search produced 56 results, composed of 
NASD and NYSE reported awards and disciplinary decisions: “Source: Securities > Self-
Regulatory Organizations (SRO) Materials > Combined NYSE & NASD materials,” “Terms: 
‘speculative nature’ w/50 suitab!.” 
 26. On November 14, 2006 the following LexisNexis search produced 81 results, composed of 
NASD and NYSE reported awards and disciplinary decisions: “Source: Combined NYSE & 
NASD materials,” “Terms: suitab! w/50 (‘tech stock’ or ‘technology stock’).” 
 27. On November 14, 2006 the following LEXIS search produced 2,842 results, composed of 
NASD and NYSE reported awards and disciplinary decisions: “Source: National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD) Arbitration Awards,” “Terms: suitability & (risk! or volatil!)”. 
Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1575–1576 (“The SEC agreed that the broker’s recommendations, 
taken as a whole, were unsuitable for the customer’s account. The broker’s firm, at one time or 
another, had been an underwriter for each of the eleven securities at issue. The vast majority of 
these companies had operating losses and no anticipation of paying dividends. In addition, at least 
seven of these companies had offerings that were characterized by the prospectus as involving 
substantial or a high degree of risk. The SEC wrote: . . . ‘The concentration of high risk and 
speculative securities in Bradley’s account, which were predominately underwritten by Paulson 
[broker’s firm], was not suitable.’”). 
 28. In the Matter of the DeNicola v. First Union Brokerage Services, Inc., 2004 NASD Arb. 
LEXIS 1072 (May 21, 2004) (“The objectivity of the use of the Beta analysis as a tool to assess 
past performance outweighs Mr. Lyman’s essentially unsupported, subjective, if not speculative, 
approach to determining suitability.”); In the Matter of Roger and Mary Candace Brush v. Merrill 
Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 2004 NASD Arb. LEXIS 3073 (Dec. 10, 2004) 
(“Considerable energy was expended during the hearing on the question of using either standard 
deviation or beta as tools in choosing and explaining choices of securities. As aids to brokers in 
choosing stocks, both standard deviation and beta are helpful, but as aids in explaining to 
unsophisticated clients which stocks were chosen, they are very likely useless.”). 
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and least objectively applied, than the ‘suitability’ requirement for 
stockbrokers.”29 
Brokers and broker-dealers are subject to disciplinary actions by the 
SEC and SROs for making unsuitable recommendations. 
In Bartholomew, the respondent . . . sold high-risk direct investments to 
several retired or close-to-retirement investors. The investors had 
expressly informed Bartholomew that they desired liquid, income-
producing, low-risk investments. The respondent . . . misrepresented to 
these customers the liquidity, risks, and benefits of the direct investments. 
The SEC found that the respondent had violated Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 by selling investments that were unsuitable for the purchasers in 
view of their age, modest financial condition, and conservative investment 
objectives.30 
The NASD Sanction Guidelines for violation of Rule 2310 include 
“monetary sanction, suspension, bar, or other sanctions.”31 Adjudicators of 
disciplinary actions are instructed to consider monetary fines ranging from 
$2,500 to $50,000 and to consider 
[s]uspend[ing] respondent [broker-dealer] in any or all capacities for a 
period of 10 business days to one year. In egregious cases, [adjudicators 
should] consider a longer suspension (of up to two years) or a bar of an 
individual respondent. Also [adjudicators should] consider suspending 
respondent member firm with respect to any or all activities or functions 
for up to two years.32 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Robert N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments for that Little Old Lady: A Realistic Role for 
Modern Portfolio Theory in Assessing Suitability Obligations of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIO N.U.L. 
REV. 189, 189 (1998). 
 30. POSER, supra note 3, § 3.03, at 3-97. 
 31. NASD, NASD SANCTION GUIDELINES 99 (2006). 
 32. Id. at 2 n.1 (“This guideline also is appropriate for violations of MSRB Rule G-19.”); 
As set forth in General Principle No. 6, Adjudicators should increase the 
recommended fine amount by adding the amount of a respondent’s financial benefit 
or require respondent to offer rescission to the injured customers. In this instance, the 
factors to be considered in the calculation of financial benefit should include the 
amount of any commissions or other profits that the respondent derived from the 
unsuitable trading. 
Id. at 2 n.2;  
The National Adjudicatory Council (NAC), formerly the National Business Conduct 
Committee, has developed the NASD Sanction Guidelines for use by the various 
bodies adjudicating disciplinary decisions, including Hearing Panels and the NAC 
itself (collectively, the Adjudicators), in determining appropriate remedial sanctions. 
NASD has published the NASD Sanction Guidelines so that members, associated 
persons, and their counsel may become more familiar with the types of disciplinary 
sanctions that may be applicable to various violations. 
Id. at 1. 
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The standard of proof required for sanctions may be higher than that for 
recovery of damages by claimants, but is subjective nonetheless. For 
example, “[a] broker who knowingly engages in unsuitable trading violates 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. [The broker’s] 
trading [of] highly speculative options in customer accounts, in disregard of 
customer objectives, resources, and sophistication, clearly constituted 
unsuitable trading in violation of the antifraud provisions.”33 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNSUITABILITY CLAIMS UNDER 
FEDERAL LAW 
Claims based on unsuitable recommendations began to appear in 
federal courts more that forty years ago.34 Since then, a Rule 10b-535 
violation has been found in two situations, described as the “fraud by 
conduct” theory and the “misstatement or omission” theory.36 Fraud by 
conduct exists, as in Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc.37 where the 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Prudential-Bach Securities, Inc. Exchange Act Release No. 34-22755, 1986 WL 626342, at 
*12 (emphasis added) (citing Mauriber v. Shearson American Express, 567 F. Supp. 1231 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 34. Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1581. 
Suggestions that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may impose a suitability requirement 
on broker-dealers not simply as an ethical, but as a legal obligation appeared in a few 
early 1960s SEC cases. The SEC reasoned that a violation of the suitability doctrine 
may constitute a violation of Rule 10b-5 based upon the shingle theory. When a 
broker-dealer hangs out his shingle he impliedly represents, among other things, that 
he will recommend securities only if he has a reasonable basis for believing that they 
are suited to a customer’s financial circumstances. The SEC utilized this application 
of the suitability doctrine incorporated into the shingle theory in a large number of 
boiler room cases. The SEC also utilized this application of the suitability doctrine 
incorporated into the shingle theory in cases involving intensive selling efforts with 
respect to low-priced speculative securities which were not necessarily part of a boiler 
room operation. In these earlier cases, a variety of other violations of Rule 10b-5 were 
also present, including false or misleading representations regarding the security, 
excessive markups, and control or domination of the market. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 35. SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2006). 
 36. Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, 132 F.3d 1017, 1032 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(explaining that while the Court “has never considered an unsuitability claim under § 10(b), 
several courts have recognized an unsuitability claim in certain circumstances”). 
 37. Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1978). Prof. Poser summarizes 
the Lamula facts: 
The plaintiff was a retired school teacher with little investment experience or 
sophistication, who had received a divorce settlement of $138,000. She told the 
defendant broker that she wished to invest $100,000 of the divorce settlement, in 
order to obtain an annual yield of $12,000. The broker recommended that the plaintiff 
buy certain debentures, and she agreed. The defendant purchased the debentures for 
$94,360 and resold them to the plaintiff for $105,250 (a markup of over 11 percent of 
the amount actually invested on the plaintiff’s behalf). When the debentures declined 
in value, the plaintiff sued under Rule 10b-5, claiming that the debentures were 
unsuitable and that the markup charged by the broker was unreasonable. The jury, in 
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broker committed fraud by executing an unsuitable trade for a client. On the 
other hand, prosecution of a claim under the misstatement or omission is 
conceptually similar to most other 10b-5 claims,38 where the broker 
misrepresented or omitted the suitability of the recommendation to his 
client, because suitability is information that a reasonable investor would 
want to have before making an investment decision, as recognized in 1993 
by the Second Circuit in Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc.39 
The Second Circuit was the first federal appeals court, in 1978, to 
recognize unsuitability as a violation of Rule 10b-5 in Lamula.40 “Lamula 
require[d] that to establish a 10b-5 claim the investor must prove only (1) 
that the recommended securities were unsuitable and (2) that the defendant 
acted with scienter. Or, put another way, an unsuitability claim is made out 
if the trier of fact finds that the recommended securities were unsuited to 
the investor’s needs, and that the broker knew or reasonably believed that 
[the securities] were unsuitable but recommended the securities to the 
plaintiff anyway.”41 
                                                                                                                 
response to interrogatories, found that the defendant failed to inform the plaintiff of 
the following material facts: (1) how the leading rating services rated the debentures; 
(2) that the plaintiff could not expect to receive annual income of $12,000 from a 
$100,000 investment unless she bought speculative securities involving great financial 
risk; and (3) the extent of the risks involved in purchasing the debentures. The court 
concluded that the defendant acted with scienter and that if the plaintiff had been 
informed of the omitted facts she would not have purchased the debentures. The 
court, however, did not stop with its conclusion that the defendant had ‘omitted to 
state facts material to an informed purchase’ by the plaintiff, in violation of subsection 
(b) of Rule 10b-5; it also held that the defendant’s intentional recommendation of an 
unsuitable security was ‘an act, practice or course of business which operated as a 
fraud or deceit’ upon the plaintiff, in violation of subsection (c) of the rule. 
POSER, supra note 3, § 3.03, at 3-92.1. 
 38. Banca Cremi, 132 F.3d. at 1032. A claim for § 10(b) suitability fraud “is a subset of the 
ordinary § 10(b) fraud claim.” Id. See also O’Connor v. R.F. Lafferty, 965 F.2d 893, 897 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (recognizing that this type of suitability claim could be analyzed “simply as a 
misrepresentation or failure to disclose a material fact. In such a case, the broker has omitted 
telling the investor the recommendation is unstable for the investor’s interests. The court may then 
use traditional laws concerning omission to examine the claim.”). 
 39. Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993); POSER, supra  
note 3, § 3.03, at 3-93. 
 40. Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 599–600 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 41. Poser, supra note 3, § 3.03, at 3-92.2. The SEC repealed in 1983 a suitability rule 
actionable under federal law which applied to broker-dealers who were not members of an SRO. 
Former 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 enacted in 1967 and repealed in 1983. Lowenfels, supra note 1, 
at 1584. “Every nonmember broker or dealer and every associated person who recommends to a 
customer the purchase, sale or exchange of a security shall have reasonable grounds to believe that 
the recommendation is not unsuitable for such customer.” Id. “The SECO regulations, including 
Rule 15b10-3, were rescinded in 1983 and virtually all broker-dealers were required to join an 
SRO and thereby become subject to its rules.” Id. 
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1. The Five Elements of a 10b-5 Unsuitability Claim  
Under Brown 
In Brown, the Second Circuit opinion defined five elements of 
unsuitability within the misstatement-omission violations of § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5.42 The court stated: 
A plaintiff must prove (1) that the securities purchased were unsuited to 
the buyer’s needs; (2) that the defendant knew or reasonably believed the 
securities were unsuited to the buyer’s needs; (3) that the defendant 
recommended or purchased the unsuitable securities for the buyer anyway; 
(4) that, with scienter, the defendant made material misrepresentations (or, 
owing a duty to the buyer, failed to disclose material information) relating 
to the suitability of the securities; and (5) that the buyer justifiably relied 
to its detriment on the defendant’s fraudulent conduct.”43 
The first Brown element is the subject of this article, so discussion on 
this topic is reserved for later. The second Brown element queries whether 
or not the broker knew or should have known that the securities were 
unsuitable for the client, 44 requiring a finding of the first element. Thus, the 
first two Brown elements hinge on the same subjective reasonable belief 
standard. 
The third Brown element can generally be proved through documentary 
evidence and the records of the clients’ accounts along with the records that 
are required to be kept by broker-dealers in conformance with § 17(a) of the 
‘34 Act, which include: records of communications with clients, records of 
communications about client activities, commission records for the broker 
that may show similar transactions in other clients’ accounts (parallel 
trading).45 Respondents may show evidence that the claimants engaged in 
the same or similar trading in other brokerage accounts as rebuttal 
evidence.46 According to the NASD, “a broad range of circumstances may 
cause a transaction to be considered recommended,” including both oral and 
written communication with a client.47 Although not binding law, SRO 
                                                                                                                 
 42. Brown, 991 F.2d at 1031. 
 43. Id. (citing Lamula, 583 F.2d at 600–01; National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Woodhead, 
917 F.2d 752, 757 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
 44. See Hanly v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 415 F.2d 589, 595-596 (2d Cir. 1969) (“Brokers and 
salesmen are ‘under a duty to investigate, and their violation of that duty brings them within the 
term ‘willful’ in the Exchange Act.’ Thus, a salesman cannot deliberately ignore that which he has 
a duty to know and recklessly state facts about matters of which he is ignorant. He must analyze 
sales literature and must not blindly accept recommendations made therein.”). 
 45. The ‘34 Act’s Rule 17a-3 Records to Be Made by Certain Exchange Members, Brokers 
and Dealers, requires Broker-Dealers to maintain records of each purchase, sale, call, put, cash 
balance, margin balance, etc. for each and every customer and transaction, or communication. 
SEC Rule 17a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-3 (2006). 
 46. See generally ROBBINS, supra note 20, § 5-5, at 5-19. 
 47. NASD NOTICE TO MEMBERS 96-60, Sept. 1996, at 474. 
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Rules may be used in federal courts as evidence of standards of professional 
conduct.48 
Scienter, the fourth Brown element, “may be inferred by finding that the 
defendant knew or reasonably believed that the securities were unsuited to 
the investor’s needs, misrepresented or failed to disclose the unsuitability of 
the securities, and proceeded to recommend or purchase the securities 
anyway.”49 An inability to prove scienter is not a bar, however, because “in 
appropriate circumstances recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement.”50 
“Reckless conduct is, at the least, conduct which is ‘highly unreasonable’ 
and which represents ‘an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary 
care . . . to the extent that the danger was either known to the defendant or 
so obvious that the defendant must have been aware of it.’”51 Although 
some dissension remains, “[b]y 1990, eight Circuit Courts of Appeal had 
adopted standards of ‘recklessness’ to support Rule 10b-5 claims.”52 Thus, 
the determination of scienter or recklessness also hinges on a finding that 
the recommendation was unsuitable. 
The fifth Brown element of justifiable reliance contains two 
components. First, “[a] plaintiff’s burden with respect to the reliance 
element of an unsuitability claim . . . var[ies] depending on whether the 
claim alleges fraudulent representations or [] omissions.”53 This reliance 
aspect begs comparison between the complexity of the recommended 
security and the sophistication of the client, and further with that of the 
broker.54 Here it may presumed that an unsophisticated client relied on her 
                                                                                                                 
 48. Javitch v. First Montauk Fin. Corp., 279 F. Supp. 2d 931, 938 (D. Ohio 2003); see also 
Lange v. H. Heinze & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1384 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (NASD rules can be used as 
evidence as to standard of care in the industry); Stevenson v. Rochdale Investment Management, 
Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13110 at *28-29, 2000 WL 1278479, at *8 (N.D. Tex. 2000) 
(unpublished opinion) (violation of the rules may be evidence of standard of care). 
 49. Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 50. Rolf v. Blyth, 570 F.2d 38, 44–47 (2d Cir. 1978).  
 51. Id. at 47 (citing Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
 52. Root, supra note 10, at 316–17. 
 53. Brown, 991 F.2d at 1031 (citing Burke v. Jacoby, 981 F.2d 1372, 1378–79 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
 54. Id. at 1032.  
 
An investor may not justifiably rely on a misrepresentation if, through minimal 
diligence, the investor should have discovered the truth. Under this standard, § 10(b) 
liability will not be imposed when an investor’s conduct rises to the level of 
recklessness. To determine whether an investor acted recklessly, and therefore 
without justifiable reliance, no single factor is dispositive, and all relevant factors 
must be considered and balanced. In Royal American we considered the plaintiff’s 
sophistication and expertise in finance and in the subject matter of the securities 
transaction; the plaintiff’s representation by counsel; the plaintiff’s opportunity to 
detect the fraud; whether the fraud was concealed; and the nature of the fraud. This 
Court has never established a list of all relevant factors, although many courts have 
been guided by the following: (1) The sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in 
financial and securities matters; (2) the existence of longstanding business or personal 
relationships; (3) access to the relevant information; (4) the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship; (5) concealment of the fraud; (6) the opportunity to detect the fraud; (7) 
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broker’s55 recommendation because of the broker’s exposure to 
sophisticated investment matters through licensing requirements56 and the 
Shingle Theory, which states that by advertising investment services to the 
public, a broker-dealer holds itself out as a competent expert in investing.57 
The second component of the fifth Brown element requires a showing of 
                                                                                                                 
whether the plaintiff initiated the stock transaction or sought to expedite the 
transaction; and (8) the generality or specificity of the misrepresentations.  
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 55. Cash v. Frederick & Co., 57 F.R.D. 71, 78 (D. Wis. 1972) (“A defendant must exercise a 
higher standard of care when he knows or has reason to know that the plaintiff has relied almost 
exclusively upon his advice.”). 
 56. Brokers are required to pass the Series 7 licensing exam to become Registered 
Representatives in the sales of securities. NASD.com, Registration and Qualifications - NASD 
Registration and Examination Requirements, http://www.nasd.com/RegistrationQualifications/ 
BrokerGuidanceResponsibility/Qualifications/NASDW_011051. (“This registration qualifies a 
candidate for the solicitation, purchase, and/or sale of all securities products, including corporate 
securities, municipal securities, municipal fund securities, options, direct participation programs, 
investment company products, and variable contracts.”). For further discussion of the scope of 
material covered by Registered Representative licensing exam, see Content Outline for the 
General Securities Registered Representative Examination (Test Series 7), http://www.nyse.com/ 
pdfs/series7.pdf. 
The Series 7 Examination is the Qualification Examination for General Securities 
Registered Representatives. As a qualification examination, it is intended to safeguard 
the investing public by helping to ensure that registered representatives are competent 
to perform their jobs. Given this purpose, the Series 7 Examination seeks to measure 
accurately and reliably the degree to which each candidate possesses the knowledge, 
skills and abilities needed to perform the critical functions of a registered 
representative (RR). Candidates should note that the duties and functions of the RR 
must be performed in accordance with just and equitable principles of trade, federal 
and state laws, and industry regulations. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of the RR 
to be aware of changes in current legislation, regulation and policy. The RR’s primary 
responsibility is to the client. When advising the client, the RR must do so fully and 
honestly. The RR must make a diligent good-faith effort to obtain essential facts prior 
to making appropriate recommendations. Soliciting clients and counseling established 
clients are intrinsic duties of an RR, and these tasks must never be performed in a 
deceptive or fraudulent manner for any purpose. An RR who violates industry 
regulations is subject to disciplinary action, including censures, fines, suspension, 
and/or permanent loss of registration. 
Id. 
 57. See Hanly v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 415 F.2d 589, 596–597 (2d Cir. 1969). 
A securities dealer occupies a special relationship to a buyer of securities in that by 
his position he implicitly represents he has an adequate basis for the opinions he 
renders. While this implied warranty may not be as rigidly enforced in a civil action 
where an investor seeks damages for losses allegedly caused by reliance upon his 
unfounded representations, n13 its applicability in the instant proceedings cannot be 
questioned. 
Id. (citing Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir. 1961)) (providing approval regarding the 
“shingle theory”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (“[Shingle theory definition:] The 
notion that a broker-dealer must be held to a high standard of conduct because by engaging in the 
securities business (‘hanging out a shingle’), the broker-dealer implicitly represents to the world 
that the conduct of all its employees will be fair and meet professional norms.”). 
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damages, such as the trading losses sustained as a result of the broker’s 
recommendation.58 However, a broker-respondent may counter with a 
showing that other factors caused all or part of the losses complained of or 
that his client failed to mitigate her losses. In a bear market,59 a broker may 
use the well-managed account theory of losses60 as a defense by showing, 
for example, that the losses suffered in his client’s account were less than 
the proportionate declines in broad market indices during the same period. 
3. The Suitability of the Recommended Security is the  
Focal Issue61 
Decisions about whether a recommendation was made, whether reliance 
was justifiable, and the broker’s scienter or recklessness may in many cases 
be reserved until after the suitability of the investment for the claimant has 
been determined. It is practical to reserve such findings because the 
existence of a recommendation, scienter, and justifiable reliance may flow 
logically from, a finding that the security was unsuitable for the client. For 
example, a finding that a thinly traded stock underwritten by the broker’s 
firm and traded by the broker’s other clients was unsuitable could be useful 
in determining that the recommendation was made with scienter or 
recklessness, and that the client justifiably relied on that recommendation.62 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Recommendations for unsuitable purchases are the most straightforward in terms of 
proving damages. It is theoretically possible, but practically far more difficult to prove losses 
resulting from an unsuitable recommendation to sell, although Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 128 (U.S. 1972), does show this to be a credible claim in some instances. Other 
forms of loss include: margin interest, commissions, and the “well-managed account” theory of 
damages which compares the performance of an index to the performance of an account or 
investment to determine whether the customer lost more or less than they would have if widely 
invested. See Rolf v. Blyth, 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 59. Bear market, ia.com, http://investopedia.com/terms/b/bearmarket.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 
2006) [hereinafter Bear Market Definition] (“A market condition in which the prices of securities 
are falling or are expected to fall.”). 
 60. The well-managed account theory can be used in a bear, or declining, market to show that 
losses suffered by a client were commensurate with market losses and that the client would have 
fared no better, or little better, if invested in broad market indices or mutual funds. See ROBBINS, 
supra note 20, § 5-2, at 49–52. 
 61. Rapp, supra note 29, at 192. 
Individual recommendations or a specific recommended strategy are typically 
evaluated against an indicated investment objective and financial profile, with liability 
determinations flowing from a third-party ex post facto assessment of whether the 
characteristics of a particular recommendation comported with the stated objective 
and were consistent with the level of “risk” considered appropriate for the investor’s 
profile. The focal point becomes the risk characteristics of an individual security 
rather than the risk characteristics of a portfolio in which the particular security is 
recommended to be a component. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 62. By way of illustration: At times the complexity or obscurity of an investment 
recommendation in and of itself suggests that it may be unsuitable for any but the most 
sophisticated investor. Imagine, for example, that a broker executed purchases of “naked calls” in 
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Thus, under either Lamula or Brown, the determination as to whether 
the security was suitable for the client is both a threshold question and often 
the ultimate determining factor.63 Paradoxically, the least guidance is 
provided for the determination of whether “the securities purchased were 
unsuited to the buyer’s needs.”64 
C. WHETHER THE BROKER REASONABLY BELIEVED THAT THE 
RECOMMENDED SECURITY WAS SUITABLE FOR THE CUSTOMER 
IS THE CURRENT STANDARD, AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENT HAS 
BEEN FORESTALLED BY ARBITRATION OF SUITABILITY CLAIMS 
The subjective standard of reasonable belief of the broker is used to 
determine whether a recommendation was suitable under Hanly,65 
Lamula,66 and Brown.67 Reasonable belief is too subjective and amorphous 
a standard in determining the unsuitability of investment recommend-
ations.68 As stated by Lowenfels and Bromberg in their article Suitability in 
Securities Transactions: 
The present problem for the industry is that this broad ethical standard 
embodying a laundry list of unacceptable activities has become in effect a 
quasi-legal standard which forms the basis for the award of private 
damages to customers against brokers in arbitration. In practical reality—
in part because securities industry arbitration panels normally do not 
render reasoned decisions in writing, in part because an approach of 
equitable fairness rather than strict legal doctrine drives these arbitration 
                                                                                                                 
small-cap company prior to rumor of take-over bid for the account of an unsophisticated investor 
approaching retirement age. In this situation, the obscurity of the company, the sophistication and 
market knowledge required to make such a selection, and the investment-type all suggest that a 
person educated in making investment decisions would have formed the idea to make that 
investment. 
 63. Exceptions to this statement include dismissal of the claim for failure to plead with 
specificity, or disposal for lack of recommendation, reliance, or damages. See DeBruyne v. 
Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y, 920 F.2d 457, 465–466 (7th Cir. 1990) (“[A]llegations as to . . . risk 
and volatility . . . appear more likely to raise a genuine issue of fact as to mis-representation,” but 
dismissing securities claim for other reasons”). 
 64. Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 65. Hanly v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969) (“In summary, the 
standards by which the actions of each petitioner must be judged are strict. He cannot recommend 
a security unless there is an adequate and reasonable basis for such recommendation. He must 
disclose facts which he knows and those which are reasonably ascertainable. By his 
recommendation he implies that a reasonable investigation has been made and that his 
recommendation rests on the conclusions based on such investigation. Where the salesman lacks 
essential information about a security, he should disclose this as well as the risks which arise from 
his lack of information.”). 
 66. Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 600–601 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Mr. Lamula, 
therefore, was required to have reasonable grounds to believe that the securities sold were suitable 
for [his client].”). “The jury specifically found that the debentures were unsuited to appellee’s 
needs, that appellant Lamula knew or reasonably believed they were unsuitable, but that he 
recommended them to her anyway.” Id. 
 67. Brown, 991 F.2d at 1031. 
 68. Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1557. 
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panels, and in part because there is no effective right of appeal from the 
decisions of arbitration panels—the exposure of the industry to private 
damages for violations of NASD suitability rules has expanded in 
exponential fashion.69 
“Ultimately, suitability rules require only good faith assessments by 
brokers,”70 but subjective, amorphous standards lead to uncertainty and to 
inefficient application of the law. Similarly, it is difficult and expensive for 
the industry, and its customers, to apply and expect a standard which is so 
amorphous. This is especially true as common law respondeat superior 
liability is compounded by statutorily defined duties which require broker-
dealers to design procedures and compliance guidelines and supervise 
broker conduct.71 
The lack of new cases which would further develop a standard for 
unsuitable recommendation liability is due, at least in part, to the fact that 
almost all unsuitability claims are heard in arbitration.72 The reason for this 
result is that arbitration awards do not have precedential value and tend not 
to contain instructional analyses of law or facts. Further, “the bounds of a 
broker’s suitability responsibility are . . . left for largely intuitive 
determination by panels comprised of individuals having widely disparate 
legal and finance backgrounds, and whose charge expressly includes ‘wide 
latitude in their interpretation of legal concepts’ involved in matters put 
before them.”73 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. at 1567. 
 70. Rapp, supra note 29, at 258–60. 
Larry Ira Klein illustrates that the examination of good faith begins with the process 
whereby an investment objective is identified and the risk associated with it is then 
assessed. In Larry Ira Klein, the expected return of high yield debt securities was 
significantly greater than the certificates of deposit or tax-deferred retirement funds in 
which customers’ funds had previously been invested. Still, as the SEC opined, it was 
decidedly unreasonable to conclude that the commensurate risk of a portfolio 
constructed to achieve that return was suitable. It did not help that the broker was also 
found to have materially misled his customers concerning the degree of risk actually 
involved. 
Id. 
 71. ROBBINS, supra note 20, § 5-6f (Failure to Supervise); see also Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t (Supp. II 2002). 
 72. Renee Barnett, Online Trading And The National Association Of Securities Dealers’ 
Suitability Rule: Are Online Investors Adequately Protected?, 49 AM U.L. REV. 1089, 1104 
(2000) (“Second, virtually all brokers require customers to sign pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
prior to opening a brokerage account. By entering into a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, 
customers waive their right to commence judicial proceedings against their broker and instead 
must settle disputes through arbitration.”). 
 73. Rapp, supra note 29, at 191–192. Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1584–85 (“[W]ith this shift 
in the legal basis for unsuitability claims has come a shift in the legal elements that must be 
proven to establish a suitability violation, from fraud under Exchange Act section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 which requires scienter (or at a minimum recklessness) to a nebulous quasi-legal, quasi-
ethical test for breaches of standards of duty and care under SRO rules which does not require 
scienter or recklessness.”). 
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Changes proposed by the NASD may increase the instructional value of 
arbitrators’ awards: “The purpose of the proposed rule change is to amend 
the Code of Arbitration Procedure . . . to provide written explanations in 
arbitration awards upon the request of customers, or of associated persons 
in industry controversies.”74 
Federal courts continue to adhere to the Brown elements, as in Louros 
v. Kreicas75 where the court stated that “[a] plaintiff asserting such a claim 
must prove: (1) that the securities purchased were unsuited to the buyer’s 
needs; (2) that the defendant knew or reasonably believed the securities 
were unsuited to the buyer’s needs . . . .”76 The Louros court described the 
continuing relevance of Brown because, although it 
does not mention loss causation[,] Brown [] was rendered before the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act codified the causation 
requirement for Section 10(b) cases. In any case, Brown does require that 
“the buyer justifiably relied to its detriment on the defendant’s fraudulent 
conduct.” This element comprehends a requirement of causation, and with 
it the jurisprudence on loss causation in securities fraud cases. 77 
The lack of an objective standard for determining suitability under SRO 
Rules continues to be problematic under federal securities laws.78 Court 
challenges to arbitration awards in suitability claims are largely ineffective, 
at least partly because manifest disregard for the law is the standard for 
vacating an arbitration panel’s award.79 Thus, to vacate an award, a court 
must find that the panel manifestly disregarded the law when it found, 
based on a subjective standard, that a broker had a reasonable belief that his 
                                                                                                                 
 74. On submission to SEC, the NASD is proposing to codify this policy in NASD Rules of the 
Association Rule 10330(i). 
 75. Louros v. Kreicas, 367 F. Supp. 2d 572, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 76. Id. at 585 (emphasis added). 
 77. Id. at 592. 
 78. GMS Group, LLC v. Benderson, 326 F.3d 75, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2003) (“GMS neither points 
this court to case law interpreting the terms ‘recommendation’ or ‘suitability,’ nor points to 
anywhere in the record where such law was brought to the attention of the arbitrators.”). 
 79. Id.; Goldman v. Architectural Iron Co., 306 F.3d 1214, 1216 (2d Cir. 2002).   
An arbitration award may be vacated if it exhibits a “manifest disregard of the law.” 
Given the deference afforded arbitration decisions, this standard requires more than a 
mistake of law or a clear error in fact finding. Manifest disregard can be established 
only where a governing legal principle is ‘well defined, explicit, and clearly 
applicable to the case,’ and where the arbitrator ignored it after it was brought to the 
arbitrator’s attention in a way that assures that the arbitrator knew its controlling 
nature. An arbitrator (even an arbitrator who is a lawyer) is often selected for 
expertise in the commercial aspect of the dispute or for trustworthiness, rather than for 
knowledge of the applicable law, and under the test of manifest disregard is ordinarily 
assumed to be a blank slate unless educated in the law by the parties. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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recommendation was suitable for his customer. The result is a dearth of 
meaningful reviews of arbitration awards. 80 
II. THE SUITABILITY STANDARD SHOULD BE OBJECTIVE AND 
WEIGH THE RISK OF A BROKER’S RECOMMENDATION 
AGAINST THE CLIENT’S APPROPRIATE RISK LEVEL 
An objective standard is necessary to judge the suitability of a broker’s 
recommendation to his client. Currently, brokers are required to make their 
suitability determinations based on objective measures in order to establish 
a reasonable belief. Rational thought is required to make a reasoned 
determination, and “[t]he broker’s suitability obligation does not rest on 
intuition, it rests on a formal statistical process.”81 Under the shingle theory, 
it can be expected that brokers will use finance theory in assessing the 
suitability of securities for their clients.82 Among the many tools available 
to brokers, “Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) is a set of formulas used to 
determine, objectively, whether a portfolio is suitable for a particular 
client’s objectives and circumstances.”83 
An objective measure is also needed to guide broker-dealers and to 
protect investors. In fact, “it is essential that there be a suitability paradigm 
within which stockbrokers may comfortably operate and against which their 
professionalism may fairly be evaluated in the face of a challenge. That is 
not the case today.”84 The SEC has supported some objective standards in 
determining suitability in disciplinary settings, including inadvisable 
concentration of a client’s assets in the stock of one company, especially if 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Here the primary trier of fact is an arbitration panel, although a panel’s “award,” as a 
panel’s decision is known in arbitration, is subject to review by courts. The standard of review is 
“manifest disregard for the law” and is infrequently found in client-broker claims. Arbitration 
awards are “vacated” upon a motion for vacature by a party to the arbitration. Telephone interview 
with Professor Marcella Silverman of Fordham Law School (Sept. 2006). An unpublished 
Fordham Law School study found only one such award was vacated in New York in the last 
twenty years. Id. 
 81. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 199. 
 82. For information on the Series 7 exam, see supra note 56. 
 83. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 173. The Second Circuit has also made reference to objective 
measures in affirming a finding of unsuitability in Lamula when “the jury found that Lamula 
failed to inform [the client] . . . how the leading rating services rated the debentures.” Clark v. 
John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 599 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 84. Rapp, supra note 29, at 262–63 could be characterized to disagree with some propositions 
of this article. The article explains that:  
‘Suitability rules’ set ethical conduct expectations, but articulate no standard of care 
against which portfolio oriented recommendations of brokers can be adequately and 
fairly judged. This is not to say that there should, or could, be a litmus test for judging 
broker conduct. Wooden notions of any sort cannot suffice to articulate a standard of 
care in a world populated by such a vast array of investment opportunities and risks 
and the many and varied strategies for their use. 
Id. 
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that stock is “speculative”. In affirming an NASD disciplinary ruling, 
evidence was presented in that: 
[Broker] Faber recommended that [his Client] McKinzie purchase 
approximately $52,000 of Interbet shares. These funds constituted nearly 
all of her SC portfolio and more than two-thirds of her total liquid assets. 
Interbet had no revenues and had never showed any profits. Moreover, 
[Broker] Faber recommended that [his Client] McKinzie concentrate her 
entire portfolio at SC in one speculative security. This concentration 
created a substantial risk that [his Client] McKinzie could lose all, or 
virtually all, of her account balance. We have repeatedly found that high 
concentration of investments in one or a limited number of speculative 
securities is not suitable for investors seeking limited risk.85 
A. MOST UNSUITABILITY CLAIMS ARE BROUGHT BY INDIVIDUAL 
INVESTORS UNDER NASD RULE 2310, TO RECOVER PRINCIPAL 
LOST IN COMMON STOCK INVESTMENTS 
The overwhelming majority of unsuitability claims are arbitrated due to 
the enforcement of the arbitration clauses contained in almost every account 
opening document86 signed between an investor and her broker.87 The 
enforceability of these clauses was assured by two Supreme Court 
decisions, Shearson/American Express v. McMahon88 in 1987 and 
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express89 in 1989, which 
                                                                                                                 
 85. In the Matter of the Application of DANE S. FABER, 10 Libertyship Way # 4133, 
Sausalito, California 94965, For Review of Disciplinary Action Taken by, NASD, 2004 SEC 
LEXIS 277, at *25–26 (SEC 2004) (citations omitted). 
 86. See Barnett, supra note 73 (“[V]irtually all brokers require customers to sign pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements prior to opening a brokerage account.”). 
 87. The account opening document is a contract between the customer-investor and the 
broker/dealer, and defines the respective rights and obligations of the parties, the inclusion of a 
pre-dispute agreement to arbitration is governed by NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 
3110(f) and NYSE RULES R. 637, and require significant disclosures as to the implications of 
arbitration and the procedural distinctions from a court action. See generally ROBBINS, supra  
note 20, § 2-3. 
 88. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (“The Arbitration Act 
thus establishes a ‘federal policy favoring arbitration,’ requiring that ‘we rigorously enforce 
agreements to arbitrate.’”) (internal citations omitted). 
 89. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989). 
Once the outmoded presumption of disfavoring arbitration proceedings is set to one 
side, it becomes clear that the right to select the judicial forum and the wider choice of 
courts are not such essential features of the Securities Act that § 14 is properly 
construed to bar any waiver of these provisions. Nor are they so critical that they 
cannot be waived under the rationale that the Securities Act was intended to place 
buyers of securities on an equal footing with sellers. Wilko identified two different 
kinds of provisions in the Securities Act that would advance this objective. Some are 
substantive, such as the provision placing on the seller the burden of proving lack of 
scienter when a buyer alleges fraud. 
Id. 
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upheld application of the Federal Arbitration Act as it pertained to securities 
claims brought under the Securities Act of 193390 (‘33 Act) or the ‘34 Act.91 
The choice of arbitration fora available to investors depends upon the 
language in the account opening contract. The most common securities 
arbitration fora are: NASD Dispute Resolution,92 New York Stock 
Exchange Dispute Resolution/Arbitration,93 and the American Arbitration 
Association. 
The NASD hears 90% of all investor-broker arbitration cases,94 
including suitability claims. Between January 1, 2001 and October 31, 
2005, 55% of NASD claims involved common stock.95 Unsuitability claims 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 
77bbbb). 
 91. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a to 78mm). See also Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1558. 
Following the dictates of the U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark decisions of 
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, and Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc., the principal forum where customer damage claims 
for unsuitability are heard has shifted within the last decade from the courts to 
arbitration, primarily the arbitration tribunals provided by the NASD. Additionally, 
the specific provisions relied upon by customers pursuing unsuitability claims in these 
arbitration forums have shifted within this past decade from the anti-fraud provisions 
of the federal securities laws, primarily section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange 
Act, which mandate a legal standard of intent to defraud or recklessness, to the 
unsuitability rules of the self-regulatory organizations (SROs), primarily NASD Rule 
2310, which embody a comparatively nebulous, quasi-legal, quasi-ethical standard of 
due care and fair dealing between brokers and customers. This shift in forum and in 
governing standards has eased meaningfully the customer’s path to recovery and 
consequently has increased the customer’s leverage to compel a significant 
settlement. 
Id. 
 92. “NASD operates the largest dispute resolution forum in the securities industry to assist in 
the resolution of monetary and business disputes between and among investors, securities firms, 
and individual registered representatives.” NASD.com, Arbitration & Mediation, http://www.na 
sd.com/ArbitrationMediation/index.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2006); “NASD ranks by far the 
most active forum today, administering 90% or more of the [brokerage industry] cases filed each 
year.” ROBBINS, supra note 20, at app. N, 1. 
 93. New York Stock Exchange arbitration is described on the NYSE website. 
For more than 125 years, the NYSE has used arbitration to resolve disputes between 
investors and brokers. Arbitration enables a dispute to be resolved quickly and fairly 
by impartial arbitrators, who are knowledgeable and trained in the art of resolving 
controversy. When a customer chooses arbitration to resolve the dispute, he waives 
the right to pursue the matter in court. Arbitration is final and binding. 
NYSE Group, Inc., Dispute Resolution/Arbitration, http://www.nyse.com/regulation/dispute 
resolution/1089312755623.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2006). 
 94. NASD.com, Arbitration & Mediation—What is Dispute Resolution, 
http://www.nasd.com/ArbitrationMediation/NASDDisputeResolution/WhatisDisputeResolution/in
dex.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2006). 
 95. See NASD.com, NASD Dispute Resolution Statistics, Summary Arbitration Statistics 
October 2006, http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?IdcService=SS_GET_PAGE&nodeId=516&ss 
SourceNodeId=12. 
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before NASD arbitrators are very frequent, in fact, 11,718 such claims were 
filed between January 1, 2001 and October 31, 2005,96 making unsuitability 
one of the most common civil claims in securities.97 Thus, discussion of a 
suitability standard for common stock recommendations to individual 
investors under NASD Rule 2310 would be applicable to a very high 
proportion of unsuitability clams. 
In determining whether a broker’s recommendation was suitable for an 
investor, the issue should be restated as: “Whether the level of risk inherent 
in the recommendation was greater than the appropriate level of risk for the 
investor.” Thus, two separate sub-issues present themselves: the level of 
risk inherent in the recommendation and the appropriate level of risk for the 
investor (e.g., whether investors assume market risk when entering the 
securities markets). 
The risk that an investor will lose her invested principal is central to 
determining a suitability claim. When the risk of investing in a security is 
excessive for an investor, recommendation of that security is unsuitable for 
that investor.98 This is not the only reason that a recommendation may be 
unsuitable, but practically, it is the loss of principal which drives investors 
to take action against their brokers.99 “A broker may assure a client that the 
broker will only make ‘safe’ investments, and then spend the client’s 
money on extremely risky securities, which lose value; in such cases, the 
client is harmed when the concealed risk—the volatility of the actual 
investments—lowers the value of her portfolio.”100 
Most unsuitability cases discuss risk, for the simple reasons that: 1) 
damages claimed or losses actually realized by the claimant did have a level 
of risk at the time of recommendation; 2) that the gravamen of an 
unsuitability claim is whether the amount of risk at the time of 
recommendation was suitable for the investor; and 3) whether the broker 
knew or should have known of that risk and its suitability for the 
investor.101 
Risk of loss is the foundation of an unsuitability claim because brokers 
may only make recommendations if they have a reasonable basis for the 
belief that the recommended security is suitable for their client. “As a retail 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Id. 
 97. Because “[e]ach case can be coded to contain up to four controversy types,” the quantity of 
claims relative to each other is somewhat uncertain, as many claimants bring multiple claims. At 
least a third of the NASD arbitration filings have contained claims of unsuitable recommendations 
during the 2002 to 2005 period. Id. 
 98. See, e.g., Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1595 (“In Aaron v. Paine Webber, Inc., the brokerage 
firm was ordered to pay its seventy-one-year-old customer, a former art supplies dealer, $500,000 
in damages for failing to ‘take reasonable steps to limit or otherwise safeguard the extent of [the 
customer’s] risks and possible losses.’”). 
 99. Id. 
 100. In re Initial Pub. Offering Secs. Litig., 399 F. Supp. 2d 298, 303, (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 101. See, e.g., Hanly v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969). 
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brokerage industry observer has counseled: ‘Almost nothing is more 
important than understanding a client’s risk tolerance. How well will this 
person weather the ups and downs—especially the downs—of the market? 
Is the client’s idea of safety having aggressive growth investments with 
some market timing mixed in? Or money under the mattress?’”102 Thus, a 
broker can be liable for making an unsuitable recommendation if the risk of 
loss is too great for a particular client, and the broker knew or should have 
known of that risk.103 
B. IDENTIFYING AND QUANTIFYING THE RISK OF A 
RECOMMENDATION 
The risk component of a suitability claim is related to the volatility of a 
given security’s price. The risk of loss is greater in investments that have a 
higher degree of volatility,104 as explained in In re Merrill Lynch & Co. 
Research Reports Securities Litigation where the court cited a document 
stating that certain types of “securities ‘historically have been very volatile’ 
which ‘increases the risk that the securities may lose value.’”105 That court 
also noted that “smaller companies . . . ‘may be less financially secure than 
larger, more established companies,’ and that as a result ‘such companies 
may be subject to abrupt or erratic price movements and more unpredictable 
price changes than the stock market as a whole.’”106 This is why “[l]egal 
approaches are concerned exclusively with risk of loss.”107 
“Inadequate (or fraudulent) advice on risks is the gravamen of 
complaints about unsuitability. . . . Hence risk analysis and suitability are 
inextricably linked.”108 Therefore, “if a broker cannot make any estimate of 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Rapp, supra note 29, at 276. 
 103. Perry v. Markman Capital Mgmt., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19103 (E.D. Pa. 2002). (“First, 
[plaintiffs] allege that they told defendants on numerous occasions that the assets under Markman 
Capital’s management constituted their entire life savings. Second, Markman Capital was aware 
that capital needed to be preserved for plaintiffs’ retirements, which explained their desire for 
conservative investments with low risk and moderate volatility as set forth in the agreements. 
Finally, plaintiffs aver that defendants never informed them of the risks involved in the type of 
trading that defendants conducted with plaintiffs’ accounts.”). 
 104. Suitability claims require damages. There are few exceptional cases which claim as 
damages underperformance. Almost all suitability claims have a loss of principal as damages. 
Therefore, the assessment of suitability begins with a loss, and looks back to whether or not that 
loss was foreseeable at the time of recommendation. Because a degree of risk is inherent in any 
investment, the issue is usually reformed as whether the risk of loss of principal was greater than 
what was appropriate for the investor at the time she made the purchase. 
 105. In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., 272 F. Supp. 2d 243, 247 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Rapp, supra note 29, at 261. 
 108. Root, supra note 10, at 352 (emphasis added). Id. at 351–52 (“Inadequate (or fraudulent) 
advice on risks is the gravamen of complaints about unsuitability (i) by institutional investors 
taken over by the RTC, (ii) by so-called sophisticated investors in government securities, (iii) in 
actions arising under the federal securities laws and commodities laws, (iv) in federal diversity 
and state court actions.”). 
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the risk and expected returns associated with a given security, then he 
clearly lacks an adequate basis for evaluating its prospects and so is 
prohibited by the ‘shingle theory’ from ever recommending so-called 
uncertain investments.”109 Thus, this risk that brokers must assess in 
forming a reasoned belief as to the suitability of a recommendation can be 
objectively quantified. 
Thus, quantification of the risk inherent in a recommendation can lead 
to an objective standard for determining the suitability of a recommendation 
made by a broker to his client.110 Further, recommendation risk can be 
quantified with a simple mathematical calculation using two measures 
accessible to brokers. Beta (β) is a measurement of the volatility of a 
specific security relative to the securities market generally. The volatility of 
an investment is increased proportionally by the use of borrowed funds 
(leverage), thereby magnifying the effect of a security’s losses and gains in 
value. The risk level of a recommendation can be calculated by dividing the 
recommended security’s beta by the equity ratio of the recommendation 
(the percentage of equity of a security position). The resulting number is the 
“Risk Quotient.” 
“An accurate determination of beta is the most important single element 
in predicting the future behavior of a portfolio.”111 Beta is “[a] measure of 
[a security’s or portfolio’s] volatility, or systematic risk, in comparison to 
the market as a whole.”112 “Although [beta] is the product of arcane analysis 
of historic data, beta information for [almost all exchange] traded securities 
is easily accessed by investors and investment professionals alike.”113 
Because “[r]etail stockbrokers have the resources to make, or at least fairly 
estimate, the needed determinations in regard to particular 
recommendations”114 it is reasonable to use beta information in determining 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Neil B. Cohen, The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory, 80 YALE L. J. 1604,  
1607–08 (1971). 
 110. The NASD supports this theory as well, as it told its members in a Fall 1998 Regulatory 
Short Take on Suitability Issues. 
When considering “suitability,” one often thinks in terms of a customer’s financial 
status, investment background, and investment objectives. It is equally important to 
consider the factors relevant to the security and/or product being recommended. 
Before making any recommendation, the firm should perform adequate due diligence 
to ascertain essential facts such as financial status of issuer, degree of risk, maturity 
date, and withdrawal penalties. It is important that suitability standards be reviewed 
with each and every trade. 
NASD, REGULATORY & COMPLIANCE ALERT 13 (Sept. 1998) (emphasis added). 
 111. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 196. 
 112. Beta, Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/beta.asp (last visited Nov. 
14, 2006) [hereinafter Beta Definition]. 
 113. Rapp, supra note 29, at 252  
 114. Id. at 251–52. 
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whether or not a recommendation was suitable, or at least whether a broker 
had a basis for a reasonable belief that the recommendation was suitable.115 
Beta is calculated by comparing the historic fluctuation of a security’s 
price relative to changes in the market as a whole.116 If a security has a beta 
lower than 1.00, that security’s historic price has been less volatile than the 
overall market over the same period. A beta higher than 1.00 signifies that 
security’s price has been more volatile than the market. “For example, if a 
stock’s beta is 1.2 it’s theoretically 20% more volatile than the market.”117 
The Standard & Poor 500 index (S&P 500) is “the [most popular, but not 
only] standard for calculating beta . . . where the S&P 500 has a beta equal 
to 1.00.”118 
Volatility is “a statistical measure of the tendency of a market or 
security to rise or fall sharply within a period of time.”119 “Volatility is 
typically calculated by using variance or annualized standard deviation of 
the price or return. . . . A highly volatile market means that prices have huge 
swings in very short periods of time.”120 Standard deviation is a statistical 
measure “of the dispersion of a set of data from its mean. The more spread 
apart the data is, the higher the deviation. . . . A volatile stock would have a 
high standard deviation.”121 Standard deviation is symbolized by the Greek 
letter sigma (σ). Sigma squared (σ2) is beta. 
                                                                                                                 
 115. See Central Nat’l Bank v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, 912 F.2d 897, 901–02 (7th Cir. 
1990). In Central, Circuit Judge Posner recognized beta as a quantification of investment risk. Id. 
 116. “Beta is calculated using regression analysis, and you can think of beta as the tendency of 
a security’s returns to respond to swings in the market. A beta of 1 indicates that the security’s 
price will move with the market.” Beta Definition, supra note 113. 
 117. Id. 
 118. The Major American Equity Indices, http://www.benbest.com/business/indexusa.html (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2006). 
The S&P 500 is intended to be comprised of the 500 biggest [publicly]-traded 
companies in the United States by market capitalization (in contrast to the FORTUNE 
500, which are the largest 500 companies in terms of sales revenue). Although the 
general principle for calculating the S&P 500 Index on the basis of market 
capitalization of the largest 500 companies is simple, the details can be 
complex. . . . The S&P 500 Index comprises about three-quarters of total American 
capitalization. In 2001, forty of the S&P 500 stocks provided half of the Index’s total 
market cap. In 1999, nine of the S&P 500 stocks provided half of the Index’s total 
return. Most money managers treat the S&P 500 as a proxy for the US stock market. 
Three-quarters of money in American index funds is tied to the S&P 500. Analysts 
using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) use the S&P 500 as a proxy for the 
stock market . . . . 
Id. 
 119. RealNetworks, Inc., Glossary (V), http://investor.realnetworks.com/glossary.cfm?First 
Letter=v (last visited Nov. 18, 2006). 
 120. Volatility, TheFreeDictionary.com, http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/ 
Volatility (last visited Nov. 18, 2006). 
 121. Standard Deviation, Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/standard 
deviation.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2006). 
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These measurements are used in financial analysis to determine the 
value of risk, which is defined as “the chance that an investment’s actual 
return will be different than expected.122 This includes the possibility of 
losing some or all of the original investment. It is usually measured using 
the historical returns or average returns for a specific investment.”123 As is 
commonly understood, “[h]igher risk means a greater opportunity for high 
returns... and a higher potential for loss.”124 
There are several types of risk associated with securities investment, 
which can be categorized into one of two types: “Systematic Risk” and 
“Unsystematic Risk.” Systematic Risk is “[t]he risk inherent to the entire 
market or entire market segment. [It is a]lso known as ‘un-diversifiable 
risk’ or ‘market risk’”125 because the entire market is susceptible to this type 
of risk and no strategy of diversification can protect an investor from a 
global market decline. Thus, this is a type of risk that cannot be avoided by 
any investor, and therefore is not compensated for.126 
Unsystematic Risk is “[r]isk that affects a very small number of assets. 
Sometimes referred to as specific risk.”127 This type of risk affects indivi-
dual securities or investment sectors, “[f]or example, news that is specific to 
a small number of stocks, such as a sudden strike by the employees of a 
company,”128 or the dramatic negative effect of increasing fuel prices on 
airlines’ stocks, as opposed corresponding increase to the shares of oil 
drilling supply companies. 
                                                                                                                 
 122. See Risk-Return Tradeoff, Investopedia.com, http://investopedia.com/terms/r/riskreturn 
tradeoff.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2006). 
Risk-Return Tradeoff [Definition:] The principle that potential return rises with an 
increase in risk. Low levels of uncertainty (low risk) are associated with low potential 
returns, whereas high levels of uncertainty (high risk) are associated with high 
potential returns. In other words, the risk-return tradeoff says that invested money can 
render higher profits only if it is subject to the possibility of being lost. [Example:] 
Because of the risk-return tradeoff, you must be aware of your personal risk tolerance 
when choosing investments for your portfolio. Taking on some risk is the price of 
achieving returns; therefore, if you want to make money, you can’t cut out all risk. 
The goal instead is to find an appropriate balance - one that generates some profit, but 
still allows you to sleep at night. 
Id. 
 123. Risk, Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/risk.asp (last visited Nov. 
14, 2006). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Systematic Risk, Investopedia.com, http://www.investop–edia.com/terms/s/systematic 
risk.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2006). 
 126. Id. (“Interest rates, recession and wars all represent sources of systematic risk because they 
will affect the entire market and cannot be avoided through diversification. Whereas this type of 
risk affects a broad range of securities, unsystematic risk affects a very specific group of securities 
or an individual security. Systematic risk can be mitigated only by being hedged. Even a portfolio 
of well diversified assets cannot escape all risk.”). 
 127. Unsystematic Risk, Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/unsystematic 
risk.asp (last visited Nov. 14, 2006). 
 128. Id. 
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Brokers have a duty to disclose these types of risk to investors, 
especially when there are specific risks inherent in particular investment 
types and, especially, in specific securities.129 Among the many rules 
requiring such disclosure are NASD Rule 2310130 and NYSE Rule 405.131 
Case law elaborates that a broker must inform a client of the risks of an 
investment.132 Measuring the recommendation risk of an individual 
security, the broker must take that security’s volatility or beta into account 
to determine whether it may be suitable for the investor at the time he 
makes such a recommendation.133 
Another component in quantifying the risk inherent in a recommend-
dation is the leverage or “margin”134 recommended in purchasing such a 
security, as leverage will increase the volatility of a position.135 “[T]he 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See Lieb v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 461 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich. 
1978), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981). 
130 NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2310. 
131 NYSE RULES R. 405. 
 132. A broker’s failure to conduct a proper investigation and to inform a potential purchaser of 
its findings could in itself be a basis for liability under 10b-5. Cash v. Frederick & Co., 57 F.R.D. 
71, 77 (D. Wis. 1972); see also Hanly v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 133. See Shad v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 799 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1986), discussing the 
need for comparison in determinations of churning or suitability. 
Suitability is apparent only by comparison with other possible investments. To 
determine whether the investments are suitable, one must know the spectrum of 
possible investments to which the ones in issue are compared. The significance of 
statistical measurements of account activity, such as the turnover rate, is apparent only 
in comparison to activity in other accounts. If an expert is not allowed to testify that 
given statistics evidence excessive trading, the jury is left with meaningless numbers 
from which they cannot judge the appropriateness of the transactions. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 134. See Margin, Investopedia.com, http://investopedia.com/terms/m/margin.asp (last visited 
Nov. 14, 2006). Definitions of “margin: 1. Borrowed money that is used to purchase securities. 
This practice is referred to as ‘buying on margin’. 2. The amount of equity contributed by a 
customer as a percentage of the current market value of the securities held in a margin account.” 
Examples include: 
1. Buying with borrowed money can be extremely risky because both gains and 
losses are amplified. That is, while the potential for greater profit exists, this 
comes at a hefty price—the potential for greater losses. Margin also subjects the 
investor to a number of unique risks such as interest payments for use of the 
borrowed money.  
2. For example, if you hold futures contracts in a margin account, you have to 
maintain a certain amount of margin depending on how the market value of the 
contracts change. 
Id. 
 135. NASD Dept. of Enforcement v. Raghavan Sathianathan, 2004 NASD Discip. LEXIS 55, 
60–61 (NASD Discip. 2004) (“Sathianathan did so because he used margin and options trading in 
his clients’ accounts without consideration of the suitability of those strategies for his customers. 
This is a grave departure from the standards governing his duty to ensure that his 
recommendations are suitable for his customers.”). 
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extent to which the broker used margin was unsuitably risky” for the 
investor.136 The amount of margin affects suitability because a drop in the 
recommended security’s price will affect the value of the position 
attributable to both the portion owned with the investor’s own funds and 
also the portion controlled with borrowed funds. 
There are two distinct types of recommendations that may occur in a 
broker-client relationship: the recommendation of an individual security (or 
securities) and the recommendation of an individual security (or securities) 
in the context of allocating the assets of a portfolio. When measuring the 
recommendation risk of a security in the context of a portfolio, the broker 
must take into account the weighted average beta of the portfolio (portfolio 
beta)137 and what the impact of the recommendation will be on the portfolio 
beta at the time he makes a recommendation as to whether it may be 
suitable for the investor. Thus, a broker who makes recommendations based 
on a portfolio approach must take ongoing measures of the portfolio’s 
volatility into consideration, and may recommend adjusting components’ 
weights or adding more or less volatile securities to achieve the best 
distribution for the investor.138 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1577–78. 
In In re Rangen, the broker recommended that three unsophisticated, inexperienced 
investors, two of them elderly and all with limited means, concentrate their 
investments in margin purchases of non-income-producing U.S. Treasury (STRIP) 
securities and speculative over-the-counter securities. These recommendations were 
subsequently adjudged unsuitable on three grounds. First, the recommendations were 
unsuitable because the customers were “seeking safe, income-producing investments 
and did not wish to speculate.” Second, the extent to which the broker used margin 
was unsuitably risky for inexperienced customers seeking to generate additional 
income through their investments. Third, the concentration of so much of the 
customers’ equity in particular securities “increased the risk of loss . . . beyond what 
is consistent with the objective of safe non-speculative investing.” 
Id. 
 137. The beta of a portfolio can be measured by multiplying the weight, or percentage, of each 
portfolio component by its individual beta and adding the weighted betas of each component. For 
example, Pfizer common stock, accounts for 50% of a given portfolio’s value, Google common 
stock, accounts for 25% of that portfolio’s value, and the remaining 25% in Microsoft common 
stock. If Pfizer’s beta was 0.8 x 50% = 0.4; Google’s beta that day is 1.6 x 25% = 0.4; and 
Microsoft’s beta that day is 1.2 x 25% = 0.3, the portfolio beta would equal 0.4 + 0.4 + 0.3 = 1.1, 
or 10% more volatile than the S&P 500. 
 138. The broker in a non-fiduciary capacity is under no overt duty to monitor the performance 
or volatility of the portfolio, but only to make recommendations that are suitable at the time that 
they make them. Therefore a Broker, who claims to use the portfolio approach, will be bound to 
re-assess the volatility each of the existing components when making any further 
recommendations. See generally Rapp, supra note 29, at 271 (“Only after the suitability of 
risk/return parameters is established does it matter what recommendations for the construction of 
or addition to a portfolio are made. At that point, however, the stand-alone characteristics of a 
particular recommendation matter only as to the contribution of the asset to the performance of the 
portfolio, which now has its own risk/return profile. A recommended asset which adds to the 
efficiency of the portfolio, i.e., one which moves the entire portfolio to maximum return 
associated with the established risk level of the portfolio, or which is made in order to maintain 
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C. RISK QUOTIENT (RQ) 
The Risk Quotient measures the volatility of a particular investment or 
portfolio at the time of recommendation by taking the relative volatility and 
the leverage of the position both into account.139 These two measures are 
easily identified by the broker140 and are significant factors in making any 
investment decision because leverage proportionally impacts the beta’s 
volatility measure. RQ is calculated by dividing the beta of the individual 
security by the equity percentage recommended (RQ = β ÷ equity %). The 
equity percentage is calculated as 100 percent less the percentage of loan 
recommended to make the purchase. Thus, β is the numerator and the 
equity percentage is the denominator. The resulting RQ reflects the impact 
of “leverage,” as the use of borrowed funds amplifies the risk inherent in 
any investment. 
For example: A broker recommended American International Group 
common stock, listed as AIG on the NYSE, on December 5, 2005 when it 
had a beta of 0.79. The broker recommended that the purchase be made 
with one-half cash and one-half borrowed funds from the broker’s firm, 
yielding an equity percentage of 50%. The RQ formula would be 0.79 ÷ 
50% = 1.58. Thus, the recommendation of AIG, a stock less volatile than 
the S&P 500 by 21% (where the beta of the S&P 500 is 1.0),141 is rendered 
58% more volatile than the S&P 500 by the use of leverage. 
If a broker is recommending a change to a position or positions within a 
portfolio, reassessment of the existing portfolio components is required for 
the RQ to be meaningful.142 Because “[s]uitability… is an ongoing 
                                                                                                                 
maximum return without altering overall risk characteristics, should not be open to challenge on 
the basis of the individual risk characteristics.”). 
 139. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 177–78 (“The correlation of a stock with the stock market as a 
whole is called the beta of the stock. The beta of each stock in the portfolio is then used to 
determine the overall risk of the portfolio. The level of risk produced is supposed to correspond to 
the level of risk the customer stated he or she wanted in the investment portfolio. This is the factor 
that makes the portfolio ‘suitable’ or not ‘suitable’ for a particular investor. In suitability claims, 
the basis of the lawsuit is that the portfolio was not suitable for the investor’s stated 
objective(s).”). 
 140. The typical data sheet for any common stock will have a three year beta calculated versus 
the S&P 500. Additionally, beta information is available through Bloomberg™ terminals, 
financial websites such as finance.yahoo.com, and analysts’ reports; see also Rapp, supra note 9, 
at 251–52 (“[A]vail to retail brokers and investors alike. . . .”), 
 141. See supra note 119. 
 142. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 195 (“Whatever the general risk preferences of the investor, 
within a diversified portfolio there should be both risky and risk-free investments. Through 
diversification, the portfolio eliminates the non-systematic risks of component securities and 
leaves only an identifiable, but accepted, level of systematic risk associated with the expected 
return of the portfolio. . . . Conversely, such a portfolio will have the minimum risk at the desired 
level of expected return.”). 
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obligation [the broker-dealer may be liable if it] failed to maintain any 
ongoing supervision of the Claimant’s suitability.”143 
A portfolio’s RQ is the weighted average RQ of each component, with 
existing components reassessed at the time of recommendation at the then-
current beta144 and then-current equity percentage.145 A broker who 
undertakes such analysis would have a defense to a claim of unsuitability as 
he would have used a portfolio approach to client recommendations. The 
broker would have known the portfolio’s level of risk and would have been 
able to manage the amount of risk his client was exposed to. 
D. THE CLIENT’S APPROPRIATE RISK LEVEL (CARL) SHOULD BE 
THE BASIS OF COMPARISON TO THE RECOMMENDATION RISK146 
As part of the Know Your Customer duties, a Broker must determine 
what level of risk is appropriate for the client before making any 
recommendations.147 To appropriately determine his client’s CARL, a 
broker is required under NASD Rule 2310(b) to “make reasonable efforts to 
obtain information concerning: 
(1) the customer’s financial status; 
(2) the customer’s tax status; 
(3) the customer’s investment objectives; and 
(4) such other information used or considered to be reasonable by such 
member or registered representative in making recommendations to the 
customer.”148 
“Such other information” may include: 1) the client’s age, as it may be in-
dicative of the amount of time that she will hold the investments 
contemplated, or when the principal amount invested may be needed to 
sustain her or provide income; 2) the client’s employment or other income 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Peterzell v. Charles Schwab & Co., No. 88-02868, 1991 WL 202358 *2 (N.A.S.D. 1991). 
See also Lowenfels, supra note 1, at 1594 (discussing “dram shop” cases). 
 144. See Reinsch, supra note 10, at 196 n.111 (“The beta of an individual component is subject 
to change over time, as an earnings report or other news may put unsystematic pressure on a 
company’s securities and drive it away from market trends.”). 
 145. The equity percentage of a component is subject to change over time, as the rise in a 
component’s value will increase the equity percentage and conversely, a decrease in value will 
decrease the equity percentage. 
 146. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 193 (“The broker must ensure that the investor’s risk profile is 
given due consideration in terms of the beta of the portfolio. The most common violations by a 
broker are recommendations or purchases of securities that are not suitable for an investor’s stated 
risk level because the broker is required to create and maintain a suitable portfolio for each 
particular investor.”). 
 147. Id. at 175 (“A broker must understand the investor’s financial needs in order to determine 
what would suit those needs. In order to do that, the broker must complete an investor profile. The 
profile consists of what the client wants the investment to accomplish and the level of risk the 
investor is willing to undertake. Rule 2310 and the other suitability rules require a broker to create 
an accurate “investor profile” and then use that profile to make proper investments or 
recommendations.”). 
 148. NASD RULES OF THE ASSOCIATION R. 2310. 
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producing activities because her ability to generate income apart from the 
contemplated investment is central to the amount of risk she may be 
prepared to sustain, since typically, a professionally employed individual or 
family is better suited to put invested capital at risk than one who is 
disabled or without ready ability to replace or contribute additional 
principal for investment purposes; 3) the client’s other assets because of the 
general desire to preserve a core of assets that can be sustained in a 
relatively risk-free investment, since often a client who owns a home or 
other significant investments is better suited to sustain risk in an investment 
account than one who has no other assets. 
“In a section entitled, ‘Know Your Customer,’ the Series 7 study guide 
advises that before making a recommendation, a broker should appreciate 
the customer’s balance sheet, the customer’s income statement, non-
financial investment considerations, and the customer’s investment 
outlook.”149 Risk tolerance in financial terms is “[t]he degree of uncertainty 
that an investor can handle in regards to a negative change in the value of 
their portfolio.”150 A familiar example provides that because “[a]n 
investor’s risk tolerance varies according to age, income requirements, 
financial goals, etc. . . . a 70-year-old retired widow would generally have a 
lower risk tolerance than a single 30-year-old executive.”151 
In Louros v. Kreicas, the client’s “risk tolerance was ‘aggressive’ (the 
other choices were ‘moderate’ and ‘conservative’).”152 Another example of 
risk tolerance can be stated in terms of investment goals. 
Preservation of capital—‘A person with this as his most important 
objective would not be willing to invest in most equity securities. ... In 
general, when clients speak of safety, they usually mean preservation of 
capital from losses due to credit or financial risk. Financial risk is the 
danger of losing all or part of the principal amount a person has 
invested.’153 
“All investments involve some degree of risk. According to the oft-
quoted maxim, ‘The greater the risk assumed by the investor, the greater the 
potential reward.’ But just what are the risks inherent in an investment? 
What risks should be considered in determining the suitability of an 
investment recommended by a broker?”154 
The most important considerations in determining CARL do not have to 
do with goals, but with a client’s ability to sustain and recover from losses, 
                                                                                                                 
 149. ROBBINS, supra note 20, § 5-5, at 5-14. 
 150. Risk Tolerance, Investopedia.com, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/risktolerance.asp 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2006). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Louros v. Kreicas, 367 F. Supp. 2d 572, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 153. ROBBINS, supra note 20, § 5-5, at 5-14 (citing PASSTRAK SERIES 7, a study guide on 
Know Your Customer duties). 
 154. Id. 
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or “risk tolerance.” If a client expresses goals that are incompatible with her 
risk profile,155 it is the broker’s duty to reconcile the expectations of return 
with the anticipation of risk before making any recommendation.156 
Accordingly, without such reconciliation of goals and risks, a broker is not 
positioned to make any recommendations to the client, as such recommend-
dation would either fail to meet the investor’s goal or exceed her risk 
expectation. 
A survey of risk tolerance options available for selection on account 
opening documents of broker-dealers shows a wide diversity in the way that 
firms allow clients to describe their own vision of risk tolerance.157 
Discussions of client risk in legal and arbitration fora tend to focus on three 
general categories: conservative, moderate, and aggressive (or 
speculative).158 
                                                                                                                 
 155. An example of contradictory goals and risk expectation would be a goal 20% annual, tax-
free income without risk of loss of principal. A Broker could explain that 20% returns may be 
achieved, but can not be anticipated without a high degree of risk, possibly including leverage; 
that tax-free income is only available in a limited number of investments, namely municipal 
bonds, which tend to offer only slight premiums above US Government-backed bonds, and are not 
likely to approach 20% in normal circumstances; or that the only “risk-free” investments in 
securities are US Government-backed bonds which offer a modest return nowhere near 20% 
annually, historically. The Broker could further suggest that a goal of 8% annual returns might be 
possible, with a portfolio comprised of US Government-backed bonds, Municipal Bonds, and 
equities that would not put all of the client’s principal at risk. 
 156. Cohen, supra note 110, at 1607–08. 
 157. ROBBINS, supra note 20, § 5-5, at 5-13–5-14. 
Few opening account forms delineate an investor’s true investment objectives because 
the categories to check off on the forms are either too general or not applicable or 
otherwise cannot define the customer’s needs. A survey of the “investment 
objectives” portion of many opening account forms found a myriad of possibilities: 
income, income and growth, businessperson’s risk, speculation, investment grade, 
growth, investment hedge, safety of principal, tax-sheltered income, long-term 
growth, short term trading, trading, appreciation with safety, appreciation with risk, 
tax free income, trading profits, intermediate term, good quality, high risk, 
conservative growth, and aggressive growth. “Unfortunately, many new account 
forms are limited in their ability to accurately describe a customer’s objective. This 
can cause real problems when the testimony surrounding the issue of investment 
objectives occurs many years later . . . compounded by the fact that until recently, 
customers were not sent copies of their new account forms unless the forms were for 
an options account.” It is important for a customer’s attorney to appreciate the various 
investment objectives a broker should have discussed with a customer so that if a loss 
took place based on a recommended investment, counsel can determine whether the 
broker engaged in a substantive conversation on this issue. 
Id. 
 158. On November 14, 2006 the following LexisNexis search produced 129 results, composed 
of NASD and NYSE reported awards and disciplinary decisions: “Source: Securities > Self-
Regulatory Organizations (SRO) Materials > Combined NYSE & NASD materials” “Terms: 
client w/25 (conservative or moderate or aggressive or speculative).” On November 14, 2006 the 
following LexisNexis search produced 26 results, composed of federal and state suitability 
decisions and disciplinary decisions reviews: “Source: Securities > Cases & Court Rules > Federal 
and State Securities Cases” “Terms: client w/25 (conservative or moderate or aggressive or 
speculative) & suitab! w/25 securit!” 
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The client’s description of her own risk tolerance, however, is not the 
end of the inquiry for a broker, as he is still bound by the Know Your 
Customer duties.159 It may be the case that a broker’s dutiful investigation 
leads him to discover that his client has not honestly described her financial 
condition or situation, or that such a condition or situation may have 
changed due to factors such as illness, divorce, or unemployment. Addition-
ally, a client may not be in a position to accurately describe her own risk 
tolerance, while the trained broker can make such an assessment. 
The broker is bound to make recommendations suitable for the CARL, 
regardless of the client’s subjective opinion of what suitable risk may be. 
This is not to say that the broker may not place unsolicited orders for a 
client, but only that recommendations by the broker should not 
conveniently fit the client’s self-assessed risk level, when the broker knows 
the CARL to be lower, or more conservative. 
As a general rule, it is not appropriate for a broker to determine that a 
client’s CARL is higher than she suggests, or more aggressive or 
speculative, regardless of the client’s financial condition or situation, 
because it should be the client’s informed decision as to the maximum 
amount of risk she wants to take on with her funds.160 In fact, the over-
estimate of his client’s risk tolerance is what often leads to claims of 
unsuitability. Another situation where the broker’s estimate of his client’s 
CARL is different than her selected CARL may occur when a client elects 
to have multiple accounts with divergent goals and risk tolerances (e.g., one 
account with broker X invested solely in money market funds and another 
account with broker Y in which she chooses to make more speculative or 
aggressive investments). In such a situation, the broker is restricted to 
making recommendations that conform with his clients’ selected CARL. 
Thus, the client may set the higher bound of risk for herself, and the 
broker may be bound to make recommendations of a more conservative 
nature.161 This duty may be owed to any investor, but certainly more so in 
                                                                                                                 
 159. See supra note 18. 
 160. Root, supra note 10, at 298 (“‘Risks involved in a change in investment objectives must be 
explained, and the broker-dealer should not solicit a customers purchase of securities 
“inappropriate in light of the customer’s financial situation.’” (quoting Fishman, Broker-Dealer 
Obligations to Customers—The NASD Suitability Rule, 51 MINN. L. REV. 233, 243 (1966))). “The 
courts in Tiernan v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co. . . . and Alton . . . both use the term 
‘inappropriate’ to be interchangeable with ‘unsuitable.’” Id. at 298 n.38. 
 161. Rapp, supra note 29, at 265–66. 
In 1971, Stephen Cohen argued for integration of economic theory into a legal 
standard for suitability determinations in a manner that addresses the essential point. 
He asserted that a suitability determination should be based upon an assessment of 
investor risk preferences: Willingness to bear risk being the first consideration and 
then, incorporating earlier work of Mundheim, the capacity to bear it. This produces 
the notion of a ‘risk threshold’ as the critical constraint on the freedom of brokers to 
make recommendations to their customers. Thus, “A widow with a moderate amount 
of capital . . . might be anxious to speculate and to incur high risks. But such 
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the case of an individual investor as compared to an institutional investor. 
Prof. Poser discussed a California Court of Appeals interpretation of a 
broker’s duty in regard to an institutional investor in the case of Duffy v. 
King Cavalier: 
It is true that the decision requires the broker to “second guess” his 
customers’ expressed wishes; however, the customer in Duffy was an 
institution, whose true investment objectives may not have been identical 
to the investment objectives as they were understood by the 
representatives who dealt with the broker. In this situation, it is not 
unreasonable to impose on the broker a duty to inquire whether the stated 
investment objectives are in the customer’s best interests. The broker, as a 
professional, may have been in a better position than the representatives 
of the institution to determine the suitability of the recommended 
investments.162 
III. COMPARING RQ TO CARL IS AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD 
FOR DETERMINING SUITABILITY 
Because a broker has a responsibility to understand the risk inherent in 
a recommendation, to know his client’s CARL, and to only recommend 
securities that appropriate are appropriate for her, an objective standard for 
determining suitability can be established using fundamental financial 
theories. 
A. BROKER’S RESPONSIBILITY TO EXPLAIN RISK 
Among the broker’s duties to an investor is the duty to explain the risks 
of a recommended security.163 The omnipresent legends that adorn a vast 
quantity of a broker-dealer’s or issuer’s literature include warnings such as: 
“past performance is not indicative of future results,” “results can not be 
guaranteed,” “deposits are not guaranteed by the FDIC,” “investments may 
lose value, including the principal amount invested,”164 and many others. 
All such warnings are intended to put the investor on notice that there is 
risk in making investments in the securities markets. These must be 
displayed prominently on prospecti, analysts’ reports, advertisements, and 
other documents, to comply with government and SRO rules and 
regulations.165 
                                                                                                                 
speculation would be beyond her ability or capacity to bear risk if a prudent investor 
in her situation would not adopt that strategy.” 
Id. 
 162. POSER, supra note 3, § 3.03, at 3-100–3-101 (emphasis added). 
 163. Cf. Hanly v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969). 
 164. See generally Rule 482 of the Securities Act of 1933. 
 165. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C. 77g (2000). 
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B. INVESTORS ALSO HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY 
When an investor determines to enter the securities markets, it is 
presumed that she has been made aware of the risks inherent in making 
such an investment. Accordingly, an investor is not absolved of the 
responsibility for thought, contemplation, and decision-making that such an 
investor must entertain before depositing a check into an investment 
account.166 The manifold notices, disclaimers, and legends are designed to 
assure that this determination is made knowingly and—notwithstanding 
exceptional circumstances such as fraudulent inducement—that such a 
presumption is legally plausible.167 
The SEC’s execution of its mandate under the ‘34 Act was interpreted 
by the Second Circuit when it stated that “[t]he core of Rule 10b-5 is the 
implementation of the Congressional purpose that all investors should have 
equal access to the rewards of participation in securities transactions. It was 
the intent of Congress that all members of the investing public should be 
subject to identical market risks.”168 Thus, both Congress and courts have 
recognized that the gains anticipated by investors are accompanied by 
risks.169 The numerous disclosures and legends that accompany securities 
materials are clearly intended to convey the risks and dangers associated 
with investing in securities to all investors, and prospective investors. 
C. SECURITIES INVESTORS ACCEPT MARKET RISK 
Investors are deemed to have been warned about the risks associated 
with investing, and that they themselves are subject to the market risks. 
This presumption follows from a broker’s duty of informing his client. 
Therefore, “an investor [] implicitly assumes the commercial risk that a 
change in market conditions may produce adverse economic 
consequences.” 170 Thus, an investor takes on market risk by investing in the 
securities markets unless she instruct her broker that she was only willing to 
sustain lesser levels of risk. Stated differently, investors assume a market-
                                                                                                                 
 166. See, e.g., Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1032 (2d Cir. 1993) (regarding 
justifiable reliance). 
 167. See, e.g., id. at 1032–33. 
 168. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851–852 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 169. Id. (The SEC’s Rule 10b-5, promulgated under its 1934 Act authority, elaborates on the 
types of conduct prohibited in connection with the purchase or sale of a security). See also 
Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 279 A.D.2d 239, 244 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) 
(“[R]ecovery is unavailable even in the face of actual loss where such loss results from an inherent 
market risk assumed by the investor” (emphasis added) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v 
Robert Christopher Assocs., 257 A.D.2d 1, 12–13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999))); Shapiro v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974)). 
 170. Robert Christopher Assocs., 257 A.D.2d at 12–13. “Finally, as a fundamental principle, a 
contracting party—especially one denominated an investor—implicitly assumes the commercial 
risk that a change in market conditions may produce adverse economic consequences.” Id. 
(emphasis added). These risks, however, are distinct from the risks of individual securities.  
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level of risk by investing in the securities markets, unless they specify 
otherwise to their brokers. 
Broker-dealers and claimants alike cite the well-managed account 
theory of damages which can be used to argue for a reduction of a firm’s 
liability in a bear market171 or a boost to the claimant’s damages in a bull 
market.172 The theory was explained by the Second Circuit in Rolf v. Blyth 
as such: 
The district court should then reduce Rolf’s gross economic loss by the 
average percentage decline in value of the Dow Jones Industrials, the 
Standard & Poor’s Index, or any other well recognized index of value, or 
combination of indices, of the national securities markets during the 
period commencing with Stott’s aiding and abetting and terminating with 
its cessation. Thus if during the relevant period the stock market declined 
in value by 25%, then Rolf’s gross economic loss should be reduced by 
25%.173 
As investors accept market risks upon entering the securities investment 
arena, this establishes a threshold of acceptable risk for investors, because 
“recovery is unavailable even in the face of actual loss where such loss 
results from an inherent market risk assumed by the investor.”174 Whether 
or not an investment is suitable can be determined by comparing the risks of 
the recommended investment with the amount of risk the investor accepted 
by entering the markets. 
IV. SUGGESTED STANDARDS COMPARING RQ & CARL TO 
DETERMINE SUITABILITY 
Because “[t]he professional intermediary must be oriented in his or her 
investment recommendations either by the creation or existence of a 
portfolio with identifiable risk/return characteristics and then by the 
expected impact of a particular recommendation on the performance of that 
portfolio,”175 he should be judged accordingly. 
The . . . suitability rule[s may] be violated in two different ways. First, a 
broker may violate the suitability rules if he fails so fundamentally to 
comprehend the consequences of his own recommendation that such 
recommendation is unsuitable for any investor, regardless of the investor’s 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Bear Market Definition, supra note 59.  
 172. Bull market, Investopedia.com, http://investopedia.com/terms/b/bullmarket.asp (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2006) (“A financial market of a certain group of securities in which prices are 
rising or are expected to rise.”). 
 173. Rolf v. Blyth, 570 F.2d 38, 44–47 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 174. Bluebird Partners, L.P. v. First Fid. Bank, N.A., 279 A.D.2d 239, 244 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2001) (emphasis added) (citing Robert Christopher Assocs., 257 A.D.2d at 12–13); Tannebaum v. 
Clark, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4088 (D. Ill. 1993); DeBruyne v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y, 920 
F.2d 457, 461 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that the plaintiff failed to show loss caused by risk and 
volatility of investment rather than by market forces). 
 175. Rapp, supra note 29, at 268.  
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wealth, willingness to bear risk, age, or other individual characteristics. 
More commonly, however, the suitability rules will be violated by a 
recommendation that might be suitable for some investors but is 
unsuitable for a specific investor to whom the recommendation is 
directed.176 
Because these two types of suitability violations can be objectively 
described and broad parameters can be laid, the field of what suitability 
cases can be argued in good faith can effectively be narrowed. 
A. AN RQ ≤ 1.0 IS PRESUMPTIVELY SUITABLE FOR ANY INVESTOR 
Any recommendation, either of an individual security or for a portfolio, 
with a Risk Quotient less than or equal to one (RQ ≤ 1.0) should be 
presumed suitable for any investor because any investor who enters the 
securities market should be prepared and able to sustain market losses, 
unless she made her low tolerance for risk known to her broker.177 Some 
clients may not be able or willing to accept market risk, and may choose not 
to accept such risk with some or all of their funds. If a client is not able or 
willing to accept market risk with their funds, her broker should reject any 
and all orders to avoid potential liability. 
B. AN RQ ≥ 2.0 IS PRESUMPTIVELY UNSUITABLE FOR ANY 
INVESTOR 
Despite the fact that “[i]f the investor’s risk tolerance is high, he or she 
can be expected to assume higher non-diversifiable systematic risk given by 
higher beta stocks,”178 there is a limit to the amount of risk that is 
reasonable for most investors. A Risk Quotient of greater than two (RQ ≥ 
2.0) should be presumed unsuitable for a “conservative” or “moderate” 
CARL investor, unless the recommendation is made as a component of a 
portfolio179 which has a CARL-appropriate Risk Quotient. This is true 
                                                                                                                 
 176. See F.J. Kaufman & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-27535, 50 S.E.C. 164 (Dec. 13, 
1989); Reinsch, supra note 10, at 199. 
 177. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 199. 
If the overall portfolio beta is much higher than 1, the portfolio carries a risk level 
higher than that of the stock market as a whole and is not suitable for an investor who 
is unable or unwilling to assume above average risk. Conversely, if the overall 
portfolio beta is much less than 1, the portfolio has relatively low risk and is 
unsuitable for an investor who is able and willing to assume above average risk. 
Id. 
 178. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 195 
 179. Rapp, supra note 29, at 272 (“Portfolio-driven recommendations must be treated 
differently than those that are only security-driven.”). 
The standard of care against which the suitability responsibility of brokers is to be 
measured should be grounded in the dichotomy between stand-alone and portfolio 
recommendations. The inquiry should begin with the question of whether a 
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because excessive risk fails to provide incremental returns under Modern 
Portfolio Theory,180 and is therefore unsuitable.181 The burden of such 
objective standards on broker-dealers must be weighed against their 
certainty and freedom to operate and also against the potential benefits to 
                                                                                                                 
recommendation is reasonably designed for the creation of, or to contribute to, a 
portfolio, the risk/return characteristics of which are reasonably matched to the 
investment objective, which is in turn a function of financial profile and risk 
preference of the investor. Where there is no identifiable and reasonable portfolio 
orientation for a recommendation, the isolated consideration of that recommendation 
is entirely appropriate. But a recommendation that is shown to be reasonably based as 
a portfolio component should not be evaluated on the basis of its stand-alone risk in 
isolation from the portfolio. In its most practical application, as a defense against 
unsuitability claims, MPT compels this result. 
Id. at 273. 
 180. Reinsch, supra note 10, at 199. 
According to MPT, individual stock risk can and should be reduced or diversified 
away by combining stocks that are not positively correlated. If an investor 
consciously chooses to over-concentrate his or her resources in a single stock or a set 
of correlated stocks, the investment strategy is clearly unsuitable and he or she alone 
is responsible for the consequences that might follow. However, market risk, which 
affects the stock market as a whole and is also called systematic risk, cannot be 
diversified away. The entire stock market could conceivably be pulled down by some 
unexpected bad economic or political news and this is likely to have an adverse effect 
on all stocks in one’s portfolio regardless of the care taken to create a well-diversified 
holding. For example, a terrorist attack will cause an immediate collapse of the stock 
market, pulling down all stocks. 
Id. 
Erlich set the stage for two cases from the Seventh Circuit. In 1988, that court 
reasoned that when investment advisors make decisions, they do not view individual 
investments in isolation. Rather, the goal is to create a diversified portfolio that 
balances appropriate levels of risk and return for the investor. The risk of a given 
investment is neutralized somewhat when the investment is combined with others in a 
diversified portfolio. The risk inherent in the entire portfolio is less than that of certain 
assets within that portfolio. Ideally, after diversification only market risk remains. 
Likewise, the return from a portfolio over time should be more stable than that of 
isolated investments within that portfolio. 
Id. at 176. 
 181. In a search for the highest current and long-term risk-rated mutual funds by Morningstar 
(“Morningstar Risk Score” of “5” and “Rating for Morningstar Risk Score” 10Yr of “5”), seven 
mutual funds had the highest rating in both categories. Out of this group the highest β was 3.4 by 
the Rydex U.S. Government Bond Inv. Fund (“RYGBX”), which had achieved a year-to-date 
return of -13.34% by December 2, 2005. The second highest β was 3.31 by the Apex Mid Cap 
Growth (“BMCGX”), which had posted 24.02% losses by December 2, 2005. As a group, the 
seven had an average 3-year β of 2.575 and an average year-to-date return of -2.80% as of 
December 2, 2005. The risk of loss from high β investments has been real for these investors. 
Meanwhile, the highest performance for 2005 has been turned in by the BlackRock Global 
Resources Instl. Fund (“SGLSX”) which has a β of 0.83 and “Year to Date Return” of 44.63% and 
“5-Year Average Return” of 34.29%. Morningstar Ratings CD-ROM (2005); Yahoo!, Finance, 
http://finance.yahoo.com for 3-year β and performance statistics and rankings (last visited Nov. 
20, 2006). 
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investors. Whatever the burden, it is less now than in the past due to the 
development of electronic oversight and compliance programs.182 
C. THE IMPACT OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR SUITABILITY 
A clear and well-defined standard for suitability would have a sig-
nificant impact on the brokerage industry. Many claims would be prevented 
by more reasoned recommendations by brokers and with an opportunity for 
better supervision by broker-dealers of the recommendations their brokers 
make. Further, electronic supervision could be effective if boundaries for 
conduct are set. In addition to the prevention of client losses due to more 
reasoned recommendations, claimants’ attorneys would be better positioned 
to determine what claims would be colorable and respondents’ attorneys 
would likely settle a larger proportion of those colorable claims. Remained 
claims could be decided on the basis of objective comparison of conduct to 
a clear and well-defined standard. 
1. Thousands of Claims Could be Prevented When the Next 
Market Correction Occurs 
As discussed above, actual losses to investors’ accounts precipitate the 
vast majority of unsuitability claims. The quantity of investors who lose 
enough principal to make a claim increases dramatically during bear 
markets,183 when losses outpace gains, and during market corrections.184 If 
an objective standard has been adopted before the next market correction 
occurs, thousands of claims could be prevented. 
                                                                                                                 
 182. Barnett, supra note 73, at 1122–23. 
In fact, suitability review technology is already in existence. E*Trade has been 
looking for a vendor to provide the online broker with technology that would enable it 
to conduct suitability reviews of online trades. Suitability review technology would 
use algorithms and mathematical formulas to determine whether a specific trade is 
appropriate for a particular customer. With this type of review, online brokers could 
identify unsophisticated online investors attempting to purchase securities that are too 
risky for their financial position and notify the investors about their findings. Some 
industry participants believe that online technology enables brokers to assess 
customer suitability more easily than if a customer traded via a traditional broker. 
n164 Additionally, online brokers would only be required to run these suitability 
checks on a portion of their customers who are classified as unsophisticated. This 
limitation will reduce the additional costs that online brokers anticipate as a result of 
running suitability checks. Furthermore, it is arguably better for online investors and 
the economy as a whole to pay slightly higher prices in exchange for suitability 
checks, which provide investor protection and promote investor confidence. 
Id. 
183 Bear Market Definition, supra note 59. 
 184. Unsuitability claims doubled from 2001 to 2003, attributable in large part to the burst of 
the so-called “tech bubble” in 2001. The reason for the delay, from March 2001 when the 
NASDAQ peaked, to 2003 can be explained by the time required by investors to realize their 
losses, retain attorneys, and file claims. 
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If the proposed standard is implemented and enforced by broker-
dealers, the majority of investors would remain within the bounds of broad 
market declines and gains, and thus would be more likely to realize the 
long-term benefits of investment in the securities markets. Such a result 
would undoubtedly be positive for individual investors and for the 
securities industry as a whole. 
2. More Reasoned Recommendations by Brokers 
At the present time, brokers are required to have a reasonable basis for 
the belief of the suitability of their recommendations, but proving such 
belief is difficult without objective evidence. Under the proposed standards, 
brokers would be better able to support their recommendations by 
reproducing the analysis they engaged in when they originally made the 
recommendations. This contrasts with the current standard. Reasonable is 
relative and whether or not a security is later determined to have been 
suitable depends on many factors. Most troubling for brokers, this analysis 
comes with the clarity of hindsight and a security’s actual performance 
which, in most arbitration claims, is a significant financial loss. 
Brokers make recommendations to their clients that have CARL appro-
priate RQs, will be better positioned to inform their clients as to why those 
recommendations are suitable and to defend their recommendations should 
a clam be brought against them months or years later. 
3. An Opportunity for Better Supervision by Broker-Dealers 
Broker-dealers are charged with supervision of their brokers, and can be 
held liable for negligent supervision if their brokers’ recommendations are 
determined to be unsuitable. The “red flags” which signal that an 
investigation is required for a certain account depend on monitoring the 
signals of executed trades and the actual performance of the clients’ 
accounts.185 Broker-dealer supervision would be greatly aided by a clear, 
well-defined standard for judging the suitability of these trades before 
losses are realized. Broker-dealers could assign a CARL level for every 
account by using the questions regarding the client’s desired level of risk 
currently on account opening applications,186 and the brokers’ input. 
Only with an objective standard for brokers can the broker-dealer’s 
duty of supervision be objectively judged. Without a clear and well-defined 
standard, the broker-dealer is subjectively determined to be liable to their 
clients regardless of the level of care exercised. 
                                                                                                                 
 185. The use of so called “comfort letters” by broker-dealers is an example of retrospective 
supervision, where contact is initiated with a customer after she has realized significant losses to 
her account. 
 186. See supra note 159 (regarding risk determinations based on account opening documents). 
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4. Electronic Oversight of Recommendations 
Effective electronic oversight of recommendations would be possible 
with the objective measure of suitability proposed by this article. Such 
systems have already been developed and are in use by some broker-
dealers,187 but for such oversight to be effective, meaningful parameters 
need to be set for the systems to monitor. 
With the proposed CARL and RQ levels, a broker-dealer would be able 
to monitor the accounts of all clients on an ongoing basis. The systems 
could measure the individual recommendation’s RQ against the appropriate 
account’s CARL, and notify the broker, supervisor and client along with the 
trade confirmation which is already required to be prepared and sent to the 
client. In addition to the individual recommendation, broker-dealers could 
monitor clients’ portfolio RQs at the time of every trade or upon periodic 
review, and notify their clients of the amount of risk that their principal is 
exposed to at that time. 
5. Claimants’ Attorneys Would Bring Fewer Claims 
Whether or not broker-dealers changed their recommendations to con-
form to the proposed standards, claimants’ attorneys would not file as many 
unsuitability claims. This would occur because claimants’ attorneys would 
be able to determine in advance whether or not the trades that their clients 
complained of had RQs that were appropriate for their client’s CARL, and 
whether their clients’ portfolio RQ was appropriate.188 
There would be two distinct results of the application of the proposed 
standard by claimants’ attorneys. First, attorneys would be effectively 
barred from bringing claims that they did not have a good faith belief to be 
unsuitable as judged against the proposed standard. Second, those claims 
filed would be vetted for at least a colorable claim of unsuitability. As a 
result, there would be fewer filed claims and those claims would better 
plead cases for unsuitability. 
6. Respondents’ Attorneys Would be Able to Settle the  
Better Claims 
Broker-dealers faced an average of 2,516 unsuitability claims through 
the NASD during the 2001 through 2004 calendar years. With the 
significant decrease in the quantity of claims contemplated above, through 
more reasoned recommendations, better supervision, electronic oversight, 
                                                                                                                 
 187. See supra note 183 (regarding electronic oversight by on-line broker-dealers). 
 188. It is true that the argument may shift focus to what the CARL is, but broker-dealers are 
already required to make reasonable inquiry into a client’s financial situation and goals. Further, 
broker-dealers are in a position to require that brokers and supervisors make an accurate 
determination of CARL upon the opening of an account, and periodically thereafter. Broker-
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and claimants’ attorneys bringing only better pled claims, broker-dealers 
could see a dramatic reduction in the number of claims against them. As a 
result, broker-dealers would be in a position to settle a larger proportion of 
the claims that were made, and dispose of the remainder more quickly. The 
quick disposition of ill-advised claims would be possible with the appli-
cation of an objective standard by arbitrators analogous to summary 
judgment relief. 
7. Arbitration Panels Would Objectively Determine the 
Remaining Claims 
With a clear, well-defined standard of conduct for brokers, and the 
historical data available to both claimants and respondents, an objective 
determination by arbitration panels would be possible. Whether or not a 
recommendation was suitable alone or within a portfolio would be 
presumptively determined based on verifiable facts about which parties to 
the arbitration could stipulate, as the beta of a security, the amount of equity 
in the position at the time of purchase and the portfolio’s RQ would not be 
subject to argument. This opportunity for objective comparison is in sharp 
contrast to the determination of current claims where the actual loss and the 
current financial position of the investor-client are surely more influential 
factors than they need to be. 
D. THE NECESSITY OF A CLEAR, WELL-DEFINED STANDARD FOR 
MEANINGFUL REVIEW OF UNSUITABILITY AWARDS AND THE 
CONTINUED APPLICABILITY OF THE FAA 
As the Supreme Court noted in McMahon, when securities claims were 
held to be within the enforcement powers of the Federal Arbitration Act,189 
“although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such 
review is sufficient to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements 
of the statute.” It may, therefore, be argued that the enforceability of pre-
dispute agreements to arbitrate requires the opportunity for “sufficient” 
judicial review. If, however, review of arbitration awards is not sufficient, 
securities claims, specifically unsuitability, may not be subject to arbitration 
due to § 29(a) of the ‘34 Act, which states that “[a]ny condition, stipulation, 
or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of 
this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an 
exchange required thereby shall be void.” 
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1. The Conflict Between McMahon and the Benderson and 
Wallace Decisions 
In Wallace v. Butar the Second Circuit held that “[a]n arbitral award 
may be vacated for manifest disregard of the law ‘only if a reviewing court 
. . . finds both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet 
refused to apply it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the 
arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.’”190 
The Second Circuit has applied this reasoning in reviewing the securities 
arbitration awards in Wallace and Benderson.191 In Benderson, the court 
stated that “GMS [the broker,] neither points this court to case law 
interpreting the terms ‘recommendation’ or ‘suitability,’ nor points to 
anywhere in the record where such law was brought to the attention of the 
arbitrators.”192 
The current subjective reasonable belief of the broker standard for 
determining suitability is not what the Second Circuit held was required for 
vacation of an arbitration award on the grounds of manifest disregard. Thus, 
because the current standard is not a well-defined and explicit law, the ‘34 
Acts’ restriction on contracting away protections are at odds with the 
sufficient review component of the Supreme Court’s McMahon and 
decision. 
2. Averting a Crisis for Securities Arbitration 
It appears that a crisis is brewing in securities arbitration because of the 
lack of legally sufficient review of awards. Therefore, the very 
enforceability of arbitration agreements is in question unless a well-defined 
and explicit standard is adopted to avert this brewing crisis. 
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